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Abstract
This study is a comparative analysis of Green party voting in national and European
elections in Belgium, Germany, Great Britain, France, and Luxembourg. This study examines
Green party voting in European Parliamentary (EP) and national elections. The primary purpose
of this study is to offer insight into why Grecn parties in these countries generally do better in EP
elections than in national elections.
In determining why Green parties generally do better in European elections than in
national elections, three different propositions were applied. The study utilized the second-order
election model, looked at the timing of EP elections within national election cycles, and
examined differences in the electoral systems used in national and European elections. In
explaining why Green parties tend to do better in EP elections, this study found that Green
parties made gains in accordance with the second-order election model. The study attempted to
detennine whether Green parties made larger gains in EP elections that occurred in the early or
late stages of the national election cycle. The study found that while Green parties generally
made gains, regardless of when these elections occurred in the national election cycle, the
greatest gains were in EP elections that were held in mid-tenn, or late stages of the national
election cycle. Finally, this study found that Green parties tended to do better in countries that
employed proportional representation in EP elections, but used plurality or majoritarian voting
systems in national elections.
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Chapter 1
Green Parties: An Introduction
Green parties are a relatively new phenomenon which first amved on the European
political scene in the 19705 and early 19805. Initially, few people noticed when Green parties
first entered electoral politics. However, by the time the Gennan Greens entered the Bundestag
in 1983, their emergence was noted with keen interest. At the time, many observers questioned
the durability oEGreen parties and argued that they were a novelty that would eventually return to
obscurity. Despite predictions of their demise, Green parties have become entrenched in party
systems throughout Western Europe and also within the European Parliament.
Elections to Ihe European Parliament were firs! held in 1979 and have been conducted
during five-year intervals since then. In comparison to national elections, the Greens have had
more success in elections to the EP. Elections to the EP are unique in the sense that they involve
voters from 15 different nations and are the only elections in the world that transcend national
boundaries. However, to many voters, the EP has been labeled as largely irrelevant and elections
to this institution havc been considered of little importance. Despite this perception, the
European Parliament has assumed greater political prominence through a series of treaties. In
particular, the 1992 Maastricht Treaty and the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty has helped to transform
the European Parliament from a purely consultative parliament, to a more effective legislative
assembly.1
The first of this study's two sections is a comprehensive review of literature pertaining to
I Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics ofthe European Union, 411\ cd. Durham, North
Carolina, Duke University Press, 1999,205.
Green parties. The review begins by examining the rise of new social movements and how such
movements gave birth to the establishment of Green parties. The review suggests that while all
Green parties are concerned with environmental issues, the subsequent development, political
maturation, and electoral success of Green parties has varied from country to country. The first
section is also complemented by a propositional inventory that examines findings related to the
principal purpose of this study, this purpose being, to explain why Green party voting is more
pronounced in European elections than in national elections. The second section applies each of
these propositions to Green party voting in Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain and
Luxembourg. These countries have been selected for two reasons. First, they were all members
of the European Community at the time of the first European elections. Second, Green parties
from each of these countries have been contesting both types of elections for a longer period of
time than Green parties in other EU nations. Although it is hazardous to make broad
generalizations based on obsctVations in five countries, the study hopes to find enough eyjdence
that would suggest thai these propositions are applicable to all Green parties that contest both
types of elections.
1.2 New Parties; The Rise of the Greens
Since the 19605, there has been a surge of new fonus of participatory democracy that
have challenged the accepted practices of politics. This surge has been sparked through the rise
of new social movements (NSM). New social movements are distinguished by their desire to
enhance citizen participation, advocacy of fundamental social change, and focus upon issues that
were not as salient in the old political arena. NSMs tended to be involved in unconventional
fonus of political participation. For example, mass demonstrations and protests wcre the most
common fonns of action amongst these new social movements. Pressure group participation and
electoral politics were rejected by NSMs because they were, in part, considered as conventional
practices found within the realm of traditional politics. However, over time, factions within each
of these groups were no longer content to limit themselves to just these means of activity. Some
activists began to spend more time considering conventional political activity through the
fonnation ofpressure groups or, more importantly, political partics.2 In the case of the Greens,
their rise can be directly attributed to these new social movements and have worked in
conjunction with the environmental, anti.nuc!ear, peace, and feminist movements among others.
Thus, many Green parties were born out of their ability to find a niche within a rapidly
developing post·materialist society.
There are many different reasons for the establishment ofnew parties. The fom1ation of
new political parties often occurs because established parties are unresponsive, or slow in
assimilating into their own platforms, the issues that social movements have tried to raise in the
political arena. Although environmental concerns were included in the programs of many
established parties in the 1970s, they were far from being the most salicnt. Instcad, many of
Europe's established parties were committed to policies that encouraged unfettered economic
growth and this approach was something that Green parties in Europe vehemently opposed.
According to Muller-Rommel, this lack of accommodation was onc of the most pertinent reasons
behind the fonnation of Green parties.]
l Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics in Western Democracies, Chatham, New Jersey: Chatham
House Publishers, 1988, 132.
J Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success ofGreen
Ponies and Alternative Lists, Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, ed., umdon: Westview Press, 1989,6-
7.
New parties also arise because new social movements are considered subordinate to other
groups or factions that comprise and support established parties. To elaborate, Muller-Rommel
also argued that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, many environmentalists looked to
established left-socialist parties as a vehicle through which thcir concerns could be addressed.
According to Muller-Rommel, many environmental activists expected these parties to deal with
the problems associated with nuclear energy, unlimited economic growth, and the destruction of
the environment. He notes that although these parties were sympathetic to ecological concerns
while they served in opposition, many of these same parties became apprehensive about
accommodating their demands when they were in power. This trepidation stemmed from the
contention that incorporating environmental concerns into government policy would nul conlrary
to the interests of their mosl ardent supporters, trade unions and their members. By alienating
their traditional supporters, these parties feared a loss of both financial and electoral support.
Although many established parties have belatedly incorporated environmental programs into
their respective platfonns, the Greens still take pride in the fact that this is an issue that they can
still largely lay claim to. Muller-Rommel argued that as long as issues like the environment
remain on the political agenda, and are not fully monopolized by the more established parties,
Green parties will continue to remain a force at the national and European levels of govemment.4
Upon their arrival on the political scene, many Green parties were detennined to have an
impact on policy articulation and were concerned with confronting the policies of the established
parties. For example, Papadakis noted that through the activities of Green parties, many
established parties have been pressured into outlining in greater detail the means by which they
• Muller-Ronunel, New Politics in Western Europe, 18.
plan 10 address environmental issues and solve environmental problems.'
Not only have the Greens exerted pressure on established parties to address
environmental issues, they have also been successful in forcing these parties to address past
mistakes. According to Blondel, the rise of the Greens forced some established parties to
reconsider their actions and policies of the past and to publicly admit past mistakes in policy
fonnation. For example, unfettered economic growth was no longer seen as desirable because it
came with serious consequences for the environment. Governments, in tum, were forced to deal
with the fact that this approach was no longer viable and that large segments of its citizenry
would oppose such policies.6
While the primary raison d'elre of Green parties is the promotion and protection ortbe
environment, there is no paradigm when it comes to the development of Green parties. For
example, the means by which the Greens have approached electoral politics has varied from one
party to the next. According to Richardson, there is no putative nonn when it comes to Green
parties and electoral politics. For example, the British Green Party and France's Les VerlS are
two parties that have chosen to approach electoral politics based on 'pure' green ideological
thinking. In tum, these parties have not been willing to sacrifice their principles in exchange for
furthering their goals through more pragmatic means of politics. While such an approach
appears admirable, not all Green parties have taken this path. Germany's die Gml/ell is an
example of a party that has slowly adopted a more pragmatic approach to electoral politics. They
'EJim Papadakis, "Green Issues and Other Parties: Themellk/au or New Flexibility?" in The
Gree1lS in West Germany: Organization and Policy Making, Eva Kolinsky, ed" New York: 51.
Martin's Press, 1989,81.
• Jean Blondel, Political Parties: A Genuine Case/or Disconteflf? London: Wildwood House,
1978,213.
have evolved from a party that originally focused solely on environmental issues, to one that
began to develop policies on a wider range of issues and have been increasingly willing to reach
consensus with other political parties. This evolution stems from a split between two factions of
the party, Realos (realists) and Fundis (fundamentalists). The Rea/os were pragmatists who
wanted to scrve as a constructive opposition and to ultimately exercise power in the Gennan
political arena. On the other hand, the more radical Fundis were committed to restructuring
society and politics and did not want to legitimatize the existing political system. The
devastating loss for the Gennan Greens in the 1990 national election brought the conflict
between Fum/is and Realos to an end, with the pragmatic Rea/os emerging as the dominant
faction within the party.1 Thus, over the past twenty years, the Gennan Greens have evolved into
one of thc most pragmatic Green parties in Europe.
Another interesting difference about Green parties is that they have all taken distinctive
paths once established. Kitschelt argues that the development and entrenchment of Green parties
into political arenas throughout Western Europe was not an occurrence that transpired
instantaneously. Instead, this process took considerable time, and the duration of this process has
varied from one party to the next. While Green parties differ from one another in their makeup
and their ideological approaches, Kitschelt argues however, that common traits can be noted in
the political maturation process of such parties. Kitschelt contends that the rise, development,
and subsequent consolidation afthe Greens can be examined in two distinct stages.' While
, Dick Richardson, "The Green Challenge: Philosophical, Programmatic and Electoral
Considerations" in The Green Challenge: The Development ofGreen Parties in Europe, Dick
Richardson and Chris Rootes, eQs. New York: Routledge, 1996, 12.
• Herbert Kitschelt, The Logics ofParty Formation: Ecological Parties in Be/gium and West
Germany, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989, 75.
Kitsehelt applies these stages solely to the case of the Belgian and German Greens, it can be
argued that they fit other Green parties, too.
According 10 Kitschelt, during the first stage, two distinct features stand out. During this
incubation period, Green parties make their initial attempts at electoral politics and have done so
on the local, national or transnational levels. A second common feature to Green parties during
this stage is that little consideration is given to developing permanent political structures. This
occurrence was notable in the early stages of Green parties that were created in each of the
countries that are included in this study. Instead of developing a party based on traditional party
struclUres, participation in electoral politics was conducted through a heterogeneous network of
movements and pressure groups. Together, they created temporary proto-parties in order to
contest single elections.9 Although not overly successful, these parties formed the impetus thaI
led to the formation of permanent Green parties. Such parties existed in Belgium (Agalev-
Wallonie Ecologie, Ecolog), France (CE 78', Europe Ecologie, Aujord hui Ecologic), Germany
(SPY), Great Britain (PEOPLE), and in Luxembourg (AL-WI).
Kitschelt also argued that in the second stage, the Greens began to consider developing
their original political arrangements into more conventional political parties, and pursue
strategies based on traditional electoral politics. Kitschelt contended that Green parties enter this
stage only after the party wins some form of parliamentary representation. For Green parties
included in this study, reaching this stage has been accomplished at different points in time. For
example, Ihe milestone of parliamentary representation was first reached by the Belgian, German,
and Luxembourg Greens during the early 1980s, the French Greens in 1989, while the British
• Kitschelt, n,e Logics o/Party Formation, 75-76.
Greens only reached this stage in 1999. According to Kitschelt, upon winning parliamentary
representation, Green parties attempt to consolidate their electoral support by developing
political strategies that help to broaden their appeal amongst voteTS. 10 However, this stage was
often a tempestuous time for many Green parties as serious, and at times, hostile, divisions
between various ideological factions that comprised these parties came 10 the forefront.
According to Kitschelt, these divisions were most notable between the realist and fundamentalist
branches of Agalev and Ecolo, and die Gn'inen. 11 In latter years, similar clashes between
different factions also arose amongst ecologist parties in Luxembourg and France.
While many sources are devoted to the study of Green parties, there is also a considerable
amount of literature devoted 10 the nature of Green party voleTS. Parkin's seminal work noted
that many Green parties receive a considerable amount of their electoral support from voters who
choose to lodge protest votes against the more established parties and in particular, governing
parties. According to Parkin, protest voters comprise a considerable portion ofGnx:n party
support, especially during European elections. However, Parkin argued that if the Greens are
forced 10 compete with other minor parties for votes in national and European elections, they run
the risk ofdisappcaring from the political scene. l ! To date, Parkin's concern about the viability
of Green parties has proven groundless. Green parties continue to do well despite the rise of
nationalist and extreme right-wing parties throughout many countries in Western Europe. This
would suggest that Green parties fill a distinctive ideological niche for many voters. The fertile
soil for the emergence and sustainable viability of Green parties, has been provided by unlimited
'0 Kitschelt, The Logics ofParty Formation, 75-76.
"Ibid,75-76.
"Sara Parkin, Green Parties: An International Guide, London: Heretic Books, 1989, 20.
eronomic growth, nuclear energy concerns, and an ever depleting environment. These conditions
are increasingly present in industrialized nations that continue to undergo social, eronomic, and
political changes. Studies have also found that Green party voters are relatively young, well
educated, white collar individuals that often reside in urban areas and who have bought into post-
materialist thinking and place environmental concerns above personal income and security. 13
Other studies have also either focused on Green party voting in European elections, or
Green party voting in specific national elections. I. Instead of analyzing Green party voting at the
individuallcvel, this study provides a comparative analysis of Green party voting in nationaJ and
Europcan elections. The interest of this study is based on the obsetvation that Green parties have
a tcndency to receive a greater percentage of the vote in European elections than in national
e1e<:tions. What factors explain this tendency? This study argues thaI the Grecn do better in
elections to the European Parliament due to a combination of variables and can not be solely
attributed to anyone factor.
11 Muller-Rommel, New Politics in Western Europe, 46.
I. Mark Franklin and Wolfgang Rudig, "On the Durability of Green Politics: Evidence from the
1989 European Election Study", Comparative Political Studies, vol.l8, no.4, 1995,414.
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Chapter 2
Elections and Voting Behaviour in Europe
2.1 Introduction
This chapter sets forth a number of theories and propositions about voting behaviour and
how they relate to the differences in Green party voting in European and national elections. The
chapter begins by discussing a theoretical model penaining 10 second-order elections. The
chapter then examines vote switching and electoral cycles and how they relate to voting
behaviour in the five oountries included in this study on Green party voting. Finally, the chapter
discusses different aspects of electoral systems and how they may playa role in explaining the
discrepancies in Green party in European and national elections.
2.2 The Second-Order Election Model
The dominant paradigm for differentiating between national and European elections was
first conceived by Karlheinz Reif and Hennann Sclunitt shortly after the 1979 European election.
According to Reif and Schmitt, there are first-order elections and second-order elections. Reif
and Schmitt argue that a national legislative election can be considered as an example of a first-
order election. The outcome of a first-order election national election detennines the allocation
ofseats within the legislature, and hence dctennincs the party or parties that ultimately govern
the country. Reif and Schmitt considered national elections as the most salien.t to political panics
and voters and are thus, the most important electoral contests. II
" Karlheinz Reif and Hennann Schmitt, "Nine Second Order National Elections: A Conceptual
Framework for the Analysis of European Election Results" European Journal ofPolitical
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Rcif and Schmitt also argue that European elections constitute an example of a second-
order election. They claim that these elections are second-order in nature and arc less important
because they do not result in govemment formation. They are considered less important because
power is not at stake and they do nol determine the direction in which a country or how Europe
as a whole, will be governed. Since the inception of the first European dections, voters have
reached this conclusion based on the perception that the EP has few powers and that the election
does not lead to the formation ora legitimate govemment. 16 As Table 2.t demonstrates, with the
exception of Belgium and Luxembourg, where voting is mandatory, a strong indicator that
European elections are perceived to be less important is thaI voter turnout is lower than in
national elections.
Table 2.1- Voter Turnout Percental!es in European and National Elections' 1979-2001
Country Average Turnout Average Turnout Difference
in European in National
Elections Elections
Luxembourg" 87.5 88.0 -0.5
Belgium.. 91.2 92.7 +1.5
France 53.1 70.5 -17.4
Gennany 58.0 83.6 -25.6
Great Britain-l> 32.2 72.1 -39.9
Source. Alam Guyomarcll. "'The June 1999 European Pari; I Eleetlens" W".I Eu~n Po/mes, ve1.23, 110.1,2000, 16S and
Institute fer DcmocnJcy and Electoral Assistance. Vmer Turnoutfrom /945 10 Date, jOO.jntJyotrr II'mQ'Itljndsx
jI..VolinSiscompulsory. !>-lncludcs2001 Gcnrnll Election
One difference in the two types of elections is that many voters choosc one party in a
national election, but cast ballots for a different party in a European contest. What motivates the
electorate to do this? Reif and Schmitt present a number of obsetvations that illustrate
differences between European elections and national elections. Other than a lower voter turnout,
Research, vol.8, no.1, 1980,3-9.
1. Reifand Schmitt, "Nine Second Order Elections", 3-9.
l2
Reifand Schmitt claim that in European elections, governing parties will suffer losses while
principal opposition and smaller parties tend to do better. According to Reif and Schmitt, this
occurs because some voters abandon their normal voting tendencies in European elections.
Voting in second-order elections can be considered a means of evaluating the performance of
governing parties. This is due to the fact that inevitably, a segment ofthe elcclOrate become
disillusioned with these parties and become more open to voting for a smaller party in a
European e1cction. 17 When national elections take place, however, many voters that support
smaller parties in a European election, will revert to voting for a party they perceive to have a
legitimate chance at fonning the government. This premise, however, is not an issue in
European elections because govemment fonnation is not involved. Instead, the electorate is
merely voting for a candidate or party to represent them in the European election. II
Oppenhuis, van der Eijk, and Franklin, also try to account for why voters choose one
party in a national election, but switch to another party in a European election. Building on the
arguments of Reif and Schmitt, they contend that a segment of the European election switches
from one party to another for tactical reasons. Voters who opt for one party, even though they
may have preferred to vote for another party, are said to have cast an insincere vote. Voters who
behave in this manner, often do so on the basis that they perceive the party they selected as
having a legitimate chance of fonning the government and prefer to avoid "wasting" their votes.
The "wasted vote syndrome" is especially prevalent in Great Britain, France and on the first
ballot in Germany, where the plurality system is in operation. In these countries, the plurality
11 Karlheinz Reif, cd., Ten European Elections: Campaigns and Results o/the 1979/81 First
Direct Elections to the European Parliament, Aldershot: Gower, 1985, 8-9.
II Reifand Schmitt, "Nine Second Order Elections", 9-10.
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and majoritarian electoral systems make it difficult for smaller parties. As a result, potential
voters switch from smaller parties like the Greens and often vOle strategically for a larger or
governing party. They have labeled this practice as "voting with the head."19
While larger and governing parties are the beneficiaries of insincere voting in national
elections, the converse often holds true in European elections. Oppenhuis, van der Eijk and
Franklin also suggested that voters use second-order elections in one of two ways. First, many
voters wish 10 deliver messages to governing or larger parties. In European elections, some
voters are more inclined to choose a party that they do not normally vote for in a national election
because they wish to voice their displeasure with the party they normally support. This form of
voting is especially prevalent when EP elections are held shortly before a national election and
this point will be elaborated further in Chapter 2.3. Second, in European elections, voting
becomes more expressive and therefore, is consistent with the central notion that less is at stake.
In contrast to national elections, in which the electorate "votes with the head," in European
elections, voters are freed from concerns about government fonnation and will "vote with the
heart."20 However, the propensity to vote for a smaller party is more pronounced in European
elections, regardless of whether the electorate chooses 10 cast a protest or expressive ballot.
,. Erik Oppenhuis, Cees van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, "The Party Context: Outcomes" in
Choosing Europe?: The European Elec/orate and National Politics in the Face ofUnion, Cees
van der Eijk, Mark Franklin et aI., Ann Arbor: The Michigan University Press, 1996, 304.
20 Ibid., 301-302.
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2.3 National Election Cycles and European Elections
According to many observers, smaller parties do better in EP elections because many
voters tend to switch their votes. Vote switching in this case means voting for one party in a
national election, but for another party in a European election. Marsh argues that the degree of
vote switching largely depends on when the European election takes place within the national
electoral cycle. The electoral cycle is the timing of the European election within the term defined
by the preceding national election and the next national election. For example, Marsh argues that
much oflhe difference in the results in the two types of elections can be explained by public
mood swings that can be predicted by looking at where EP elections fall with respect to the
national election cycle and Ihis position in the electoral cycle matters for the choices made by
voters. Marsh then goes on to contend that there is a correlation between the rise and fall of
support for larger and smaller parties and the location of the EP election within the national
election cycle. 21
Building on Marsh's revelations, Franklin argues that voters' behave differently when a
national election is imminent than when one has occurred.22 Like Franklin, Curtice agrees that
the results of an EP election held just after a national election can also have a very different
outcome from one held during another stage of the national electoral cycle. Curtice contended
that in the immediate aftermath of a national election, the transfer of votes from larger to smaller
parties would be less pronounced. This can be attributed to the fact thai governing parties would
21 Michael Marsh, "Testing the Second-Order Election Model after Four European Elections",
European British Journal ofPolitical Science, vo1.28, no.4, 606.
11 Mark Franklin, "European Elections and the European Voter" in European Union: Power and
Policy Making, Jeremy J. Richardson, ed., London: Routledge, 194.
"
be pennitted a brief honeymoon period, a period in which voters may not have had much time (0
become disillusioned with such parties,lJ However, it should be noted that honeymoon periods
will vary from country to country and from election to election. For the purposes ofthis study,
EP elections that fall under this category are those that have occurred within 18 months of the
last national election. Mid-lenn EP elections are those that are held 18 months after the last
national election. but not 18 months before the next national election. Late stage elections are
those held within 18 months afthe next national cleclion.24
While vOlers are often less critical of governing parties in the early stages of the national
election cycle, as the cycle advances however, and the next EP election occurs in the mid, or laIc
stages of the national election cycle, two things happen to affect the behaviour of voters should a
European election take place. First, when a EP election takes place during these two stages, a
considerable portion of the electorate will take the opportunity to give the established parties a
piece of their mind by casting a protest vote. Second, voters may cast an expressive vote for a
smaJlerparty.l'
As stated earlier, since European elections are held at the same time in all countries, but
national elections are not, it follows that there would be a lack of synchronization between the
two types of elections. Sometimes the European elections take place shortly after a national
2) John Curtice, "The 1989 European Election: Protest or Green Tide?" ,Electoral Studies, vol.8,
no.3, 1989,224.
14 Classifying EP elections that fall in the early, mid, or late stages of the national election cycle
is problematic and open to intelpretation of the individual. This is because there are no
universally accepted definitions of what constitutes a early, mid-tenn, or late stage election. For
the pUlposes of this study, the operationalization of stages divides the electoral cycle into three
approximately equal time periods and allows for an analysis of outcomes in all three stages.
"Franklin, "European Elections and the European Voter", 195.
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election and sometimes in the mid, or late stages of the national election cycle. This study will
attempt to determine whether the timing of European elections within the national electoral cycle
is a factor in explaining discrepancies in Green party voting in the two types of elections.
2.4 Electoral Systems
Another proposition that this study examines is electoral systems and how they may relate
to Green parties doing better in EP elections than in national elections. While all members that
comprise the EU send representatives to sit in the European Parliament, the means in which they
do so varies from country to country. This is because there is no uniform electoral system for
European elections, leaving member states to employ different electoral rules and fonnulas at
their discretion. In many cases, differences in the electoral rules used by each country for
national and European elections are marginal. In other cases, very different electoral systems are
used. It would be expected that countries that use very different rules in the two types of
elections would lead to very different results in these contests.
In each of the countries included in this study, elections are conducted under the plurality
or proportional representation electoral systems. A widely accepted hypothesis derived from the
study of electoral systems is that the plurality method favours the development of a two-party
system, while proportional representation encourages a multi-party system.16 According to
Duverger, this proposition is one that approximates a true sociological law. Duverger explains
the differential effects orlhe eloctoral system in lenus of'mochanical' and 'psychological'
factors. The mechanical effect of the plurality system is that all but two of the more hegemonic
16 Maurice Duvcrger, Political Parties: Their Organization alld Activity in the Modern State,
London: Meuthen, 1955,204·205.
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parties are under-represented because they lend to lose in each district. The British Grecn Party
is one such example of a party that has to date, been unsuccessful in winning parliamentary
representation in national elections because of the plurality system. Reinforcing the mechanical
factor is the psychological factor. According to Duverger, the psychological factor is based on
the notion that voters are cognizant of the fact that a vote for a smaller party often becomes a
'wasted vote'. Rather than vote for a party thai is deemed to have little, or no chance of winning,
a voler will cast a ballot for a party thai is perceived to have a better chance. As such, the
plurality system rewards larger parties and is often a serious detriment to the success of smaller
parties.2?
While plurality and majoritarian systems tcnd to discourage smaller panies, the oonverse
can be argued in systems based on proportional representation. According to Duverger, PR
encourages the development of smaller parties. This is because of the fact that the percentage of
the seats a smaller party receives is supposed to be reflective of the percentage of the vote that
the party gamers.18
While many small parties do poorly in the two types of elections, regardless of what type
of electoral system is employed, Richardson and Rootes agree that Duverger's proposition can be
applied to the case of many Green parties. They argue that the national electoral systems in
oountries like Great Britain and France, provides few opportunities for Green parties to have
much of an impact on the results of national elections. This is because many voters may be
hesitant to cast a ballot for a party that is perceived as having no realistic chance of winning.
21 Duverger, Political Parties, 217.
,. Ibid., 252.
18
This ties in with Duverger's notion of the psychological factor and such thinking is especially
apparent in national elections in Great Britain, where the Grecn Party has traditionally done
poorly.29
Thus, it would appear that Green parties would perfonn better in European elections
conducted under PRo than in national elections conducted under majoritarian or plurality systems.
This would be expected to be particularly true in countries like Great Britain and France, where
very different types of electoral systems are used for the two types of elections. However, in
Belgium, Gennany and Luxembourg, PR, or elements of PR, are used in both types of elections.
While it would be expected that the electoral systems in these three countries would have little
impact on Green Party vOling, slight differences do in fact exist that make Green party voting
more favourable in EP elections than in national elections.
2.5 Conclusion
Currently, there has been little dispute over the validity of each of the propositions that
will be tested over the course of this study. European parliamentary elections are widely
accepted as falling under the 'second-order' category. Smaller parties tend to win a larger
percentage of the vote in European elections and this is more pronounced when these elections
are held in the mid, or latc stages of the national electoral cycle. Finally, smaller parties have a
tendency 10 do belter in countries in which PR is used, rather than in countries that employ
plurality or majoritarian eleclorlll systems.
While each of these propositions are vaJid, and the subsequent literature is widely
" Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes, eds. The Development a/Green Parties in Europe, New
York: Routledge, 1996, 16-17.
19
supportive of them, there are a number of questions that Ihis study will attempt 10 address. For
example, the literature only makes generalizations about small parties and makes no distinction
between factional or interest based parties and movement based parties with a strong ideology
like the Greeos. As well, the literature does not adequately tcst these propositions to see to what
exten! they are applicable to Green parties and Green party voting. For example, do Green
parties do better at the expense ofmore established parties, or other smaller parties? Do the
Greens do betler in EP elections that are held in the early, or in the mid to lale stages of the
election cycle? Do differences in the electoral rules in the two types of elections playa role in
detennining how large a percentage of the vale a Green party will receive, and ifso. in which
countries is this most evident? In an attempt to respond to these questions, careful consideration
must be given before conclusions on Green party voting can be reached. With these questions in
mind, the study now applies these propositions to each ofthe countries selected.
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Chapter 3
Belgium: Agalev and EcoID
3.1 Belgian Politics and the Greens
Belgium's political environment is unique in the sense that the country is divided inlo two
distinct regions. These differences are especially evident within the Belgian party system, where
the major parties have divided themselves inlo two groups based on the cleavages of regionalism
and language.30 The practice of dividing political parties along these lines extends to Belgium's
two ecology parties. The Flemish Green party, Agalcv. only contest elections in Flanders and in
the city ofBrossels, while its Francophone counterpart, Ecolo, only contests elections in
Wallonia and Brussels.
In Belgium, the electoral histories of Agalev and Ecolo have closely mirrored each otheT.
In the early years of both parties, electoral politics was conducted on an election by election
basis, with little consideration given to establishing permanent political organizations based
along the lines of traditional parties.Jl The early years of Agalev and Ecolo were also marked by
a rapid entry into the inner sanctum of the national political arena. In 1981, both Agalev and
Ecolo entered the Belgian Parliament, marking the first time that any Green party had
accomplished the feat. Since that time, both parties have attempted to establish themselves as
30 Anthony Mughan, "Belgium" in Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and
Attitudinal Strnctures in Western Countries, Mark Franklin, Thomas T. Mackie and Henry
Valens, eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992,83; Arend Lijphart, ed., Conflict
and Coexistence in Belgium: The Dynamics ofa Culturally Divided Society, Berkeley: Institute
of International Studies, 1981, 6.
" Kitschelt, The Logics ojPartyFormation, 75-76.
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viable alternatives to Belgium's established parties. J2 Finally, since the 1999 national election,
both parties are the third largest party groups in their respective regions and currently find
themselves in the enviable position ofheing coalition partners in the current national
government.
3: 1:1 The Greens in Flanders: The Electoral History of Agalev
The origins of Agalev date back to the Catholic revival movement, Anders Gaoll Leven,
(To Live Differently). The early years ofAnders Goan Leven were entirely non-political and the
initial aim orlhe movement was to adhere to the principles of solidarity, sobriety, and silence.
By the early 1970s, Anders Goan Leven slowly began to tum its attention to politics. This initial
involvement with politics was based on supporting candidates from Belgium's existing parties
who were sympathetic to the concerns of environmentalists. However, this approach often
proved to be groundless because most of the candidates that Anders Gaan Leven supported failed
to deliver on the promises that they made to the movement."
In the late 1970s however, Anders Gaan Leven had grown disillusioned with the practice
of supporting the candidates of the established parties. As a result, the Anders Gaan Leven
movement made the explicit decision to present their own party lists for national elections.
While Agalev can be considered one of the most successful Green parties in Europe today, the
initial performances of Agalev were hardly impressive. In the national election campaigns of
" Herbert Kitschelt and StafHellemans, Beyond the Ellropean Left: Ideology alld Political
Action in the Belgian Ecology Parties, London: Duke University Press, 1990, 41; John
Fitzmaurice, The Politics ofBelgium: Crisis and Compromise in a Plural Society, New York.: St.
Martin's Press, 1983, 183.
"Kitschelt, The Logics ofParty Formation, 77.
22
1977 and 1978, Agalev presented candidates in the Flemish province of Antwerp, receiving 0.3
and 0.7 percent of the vOle respeclively.J.l While these two national campaigns made Agalev
more visible, electoral politics was not supposed to be the primary concern of the movement
This was because the founders ofAnders Gaan Leven agreed that contesting elections was only
supposed to serve as a temporary political arrangement and were vehemently opposed to
becoming mired with all of the trappings that a pennanent political party would generate,'S
Building on their perfonnance in the 1977 and 1978 national elections, the founders of
the party decided 10 present candidates for the first direct elections to the European Parliament in
1979. The primary purpose for their involvement in European elections was to raise
environmental issues with the established parties, while winning seats was a secondary concern.
Agalev's perfonnance in the e1eclion served as a breakthrough, as they garnered an impressive
2.3 percent of the vole and helped contribute 10 the establisrunent of a pennanenl Green party in
Flanders.'·
Although Agalev was originally a temporary political party, many supporters within the
party supported the idea of contesting future elections as a pennanenl political entity. However,
this notion was not universally accepted within all factions of the party. When the founders of
Anders Gaan Leven decided to present candidates in the 1977 and 1978 national elections, these
.. Kris Derschouwcr, "Belgium: The Ecologists and Agalev" in Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, cd.,
New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and Success o/Green Parties and Alternative Lists,
London: Westview Press, 1989,41.
"Kitsehelt, l1le Logics o/Party Formation, 77.
.. Michael O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe: New Politics,
Old Predicaments, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, tol.
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temporary political arrangements had been controlled by the movement and not by political
activists. Careful consideration was given to ensuring that power remained in the hands ofthe
grassroots and efforts were made to avoid all means ora traditional party hierarchy. For
example, if a potential candidate wanted to run in an election under the Agalcv label, permission
was required from the national bureau of Anders Goan Leven. This arrangement was fine while
Agalev did not have representation in the Belgian or European Parliaments. However, the crucial
turning point for Agalev came in 1981, when the party polled 3.9 percent of the VOle, and
subsequently elected two members to sit in the Belgium ChamberofDeputies.J1 With entry into
the national political arena, it became apparent that Agalev was compelled to organize
themselves somewhat along the lines of a traditional political party, with an organized political
structure.)! Without having made an explicit decision, Anders Gaan Leven, the movement, had
evolved into Agalev, the political party.
During the mid and late 19805, Agalev attempted to consolidate their support. Building
on their success in the 1981 national election, Agalev looked to the 1984 EP election as a means
to continue spreading their message on the European stage. In this election, Agalev captured 7.1
percent of the Flemish vote. More importantly, the party was able to win its first seat in the
European Parliament.19 In the 1985 and 1987 national elections, Agalev looked to convince
Flemish voters that they were a viable alternative to the established parties and that the party's
success in 1981 was not an anomaly. By polling 3.7 percent of the vote in the 1985 national
"Kitsche1t and Hellemans, Beyond the European Left, 42.
JI Derschouwer, "Belgium: The Ecologists and Agalev", 43 .
.. Guido van der Berghe, "Belgium", Electoral Studies, voU, no.3, 1984,267.
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election, Agalev again won scats in the Belgian Parliament,lhis time by doubling their
representation by winning fouf seats.40 In 1987, Agalev once again improved upon their
performance from the previous national election. This time, the party captured 4.5 percent ofthe
Yote and captured two additional scats, giving them a total of six'"
The year 1989 is often remembered by ecologists throughout Europe, as a year in which
the environmental movement made considerable progress throughout the European Community.
The Flemish Greens were also benefactors afthis 'green tide', For the second consecutive EP
election, Agalev improved on their performance from the previous EP election. By winning 7.6
percent afme regional vole, Agalev was also successful in defending their one seat in the
European Parliamenl.42
While Agalev made consistent gains in their electoral perfonnances throughout the
1980s, by the early 199Os, their electoral support began to stagnate. This stagnation can be
attributed to the fact that after contesting a series of national and European elections, voters now
considered Agalev as established members of Belgium's party system. For example, in the 1991
national election, Agalev was able to only slightly improve on their perfonnance from the 1987
election. In this election, the party made only modest gains, capturing 4.9 percent of the vote but
.. John Fitzmaurice and Guido van der Berghe, "The Belgian General Election of 1985",
Electoral Studies, vol.5, no.l, 1986,76.
., Marc Hooghe and Benoit Rihoux, "The Green Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of
June 1999", Environmental Politics, vol.9, no.3, 130.
OJ O'Neill, Green Parties alld Political Change in Contemporary Europe. 104-105.
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still raised their overall representation in the national parliament 10 seven members.~J The period
of stagnation that Agalev firsl witnessed in the early 1990s continued in the 1994 European
election and the national election of 1995. While retaining representation in the EP, the party
dropped to 6.7 percent of the vote in Flanders," In the 1995 national election, their share of the
vote shrank by half a percentage point and even worse, Agalcv lost two of its seven seats."l
By the late 19905, Agalev was successful in reversing the trend towards a shrinking share
nfthe vole. In the 1999 EP election, Agalev secured 12 percent of the Flemish vote, 7.5 percent
nationally. This was the largest share of the vole thaI the party bad ever garnered. More
importantly, Agalev also captured an additional scat, giving them two in the EP.-46 In the
concurrent national election, Agalev won 7.0 percent of the vote and claimed a party record, nine
seats in the national legislature. This impressive perfonnance wcnt even furthcr as they were
invited for the first time to join in fonning a coalition government."
"Hooghe and Rihoux, 'The Grecn Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999",
130.
.. Elizabeth Bomberg, Green Parties and Politics in the European Union, New York: Routledge,
1998,97.
"Hooghe and Rihoux, 'The Green Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999",
130.
.. Neil Carter, "The Greens in the 1999 European Parliamentary Elections" Environmental
Politics, vo1.8, no.4, 16
., Hooghe and Rihoux, ''The Green Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999",
130.
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3: 1:2 The Greens in Wallonia: The Electoral History ofEcolo
Unlike its counterpart in Flanders, Ecolo's origins was, from the outset, an unambiguous
attempt at forming a political party. The roots of Ecolo can he traced to various movements and
ideological factions that originated from within the Belgian political arena. In the latc 19705,
many Green activists were determined to bring the Wallonian Green movement under a single
political banner.48 The first foray in national politics occurred in the 1977 national election,
where under the party label Wallonie-Ecologie, Green lists where presented in eight regions of
Wallonia, while another Green party, Ecc/og, also presented candidates in Brussels. In this
initial entry into electoral politics, both lists were only able to muster 1.1 percent orlhe vote.
While hardly encouraging, the founders of these two lists could find solace, when in 1978, the
party began to emerge from its transitory begirmings into a more permanent political
organization, In the 1978 national election, WQllonie~Ecologiemade gains from the pervious
year bywilUling 3.7 percent of the vote. While this was an improvement, they remained on the
periphery of Bclgian politics because they failed to win parliamentary representation.49
Although the party had made only modest inroads in national politics, it was on the
European stage that the Wallonian Greens made its first real breakthrough. In the 1979 EP,
ecologists who had previously contested national elections under the Wallonie-Ecologie or
Ecolog banners, presented a single list under the label Europe Ecologic. This list polled a
respcctable 5.1 percent of the French-speaking vote. While Europe Ecologic did not win any
48 Derschouwer, "Belgium: The Ecologists and Agalev", 42.
49 Rihoux, "Belgium: Greens in a Divided Society", 93.
27
seats, this surprising result served as a catalyst for a ronnal Green party when in March 1980.
Ecolo officially became a permanent political party. SCI
During the early to mid 19805, Ecolo experienced a string of successive electoral contests
where the party expanded on lhe size of their electoral support and parliamentary representation.
Like Agalev, the 1981 national election served as an important breakthrough for the party. In
this election, the party polled 5.9 pen::ent of the vole in Wallonia and more importantly, they
e1ecled two members 10 sit in the Chamber ofDeputies.J1 Instantly, Ecolo was transformed from
a party on the periphery of the political spectrum, to one that was now a part ofthc inner sanctum
of the Belgian political arena. Three years later. the 1984 EP election signified a breakthrough
for Ecolo at the European level. This election saw the pany win 9.9 percent of the Wallonian
vOle and the party also elected their first member 10 sit in lhe European Parliament. In the 1985
national election, the pany once again increased their share of the vOle and also increased their
membemUp in the Belgian legislature from two to five.5J
By the late 1980s, Ecolo's perfonnance in elections was marked with mixed results. For
example, the 1987 national election was a bitler disappointment as the party lost two of its seats
in the ChamberofDeputies.'J The 1989 EP election also signified further stagnation as Ecolo's
share of the VOle in Wallonia slipped from its 1984 level. However, they still were successful in
10 Bomberg, Green Partie", and Politics in the European Union, 85.
11 O'Neill, Green Parries alld Political Change in COlllemporary Europe, 103.
'2 Bomberg, Green Parties alld Polities;n the European Union, 90.
1J Hooghe and Rihoux, "The Gn:cn Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999",
130.
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winning 6.3 percent afthe vote and also seized a seal from the PRL, giving them an additional
member in the European Parliament.~
On the national scene, by 1991, the party was able 10 rebound from its disappointing
performance in 1987. The 1991 national election was held during a period in which Belgium
was in the brink of economic recession and the established parties were hit with a high level of
voter dissatisfaction. Combined, these two factors allowed the party the opportunity to gamer
5.1 percent of the national vote and helped them capture 10 seats in the national legislature."
During the mid 19905, the party once again was subjected to a couple ofelectoral
setbacks. First, in the 1994 EP election, Ecola was disappointed by their perfonnance which
subsequently led to the party losing one of its seals in the EP. This downward trend continued
into the 1995 national election as Ecolo's share of the vote dropped by a full percentage point
from the 1991 national election. In this contest, the party won only 4.0 percent of the vote and
this led to the party losing four of its 10 seats in the Belgian parliament.56
By the late 1990s, Ecolo, like their Flemish counterparts, were successful in taking
advantage of a series of problems and scandals that were linked to Belgian's governing parties.
For example, in the 1999 EP election, Ecolo secured a very impressive 22 percent of the regional
vote and won three scats." In the concurrent national elcction, Ecolo garnered 7.4 percent of the
S-4 O'Neill, Gree" Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 105.
SS Ibid., 106.
S(i Hooghe and Rihoux, "The Green Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999",
130.
S7 Carter, "The Greens in the 1999 European Parliamentary Elcctions", 160.
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national vote and this enabled the party to claim a record II seats. This breakthrough went even
further as they were invited for the first time to join in a government coalition.'3
3:2 The Belgian Electoral System
Unlike the national electoral systems used in France (Chapter Four) and Great Britain
(Chapter Six), the national electoral system used in Belgium is much more favourable to smaller
parties. This is due 10 the fact that under Belgian electoral law, the allocation of seats in nationaJ
elections must be accorded based on proportional representation,S9
One of the most interesting features about the Belgian electoral system is that voting is
compulsory. In national elections, each political party submits an ordered list of candidates to
the electorate and voters may cast their ballots in a variety of different ways. First, the electorate
may vote for the party list as a whole. A vote in this manner implies that the voter accepts the
order of the list in which the candidates have been placed by the party. Second, the voter can casl
a ballot for any given candidate or party by indicating their preference. Since 1995, this choice
has been expanded so that the voting in Belgium is now based on a multiple preferential voting
system. Third, the voter can vote for any given candidate or alternate candidate. Finally, they
can cast a preference vote for an altcrnate candidate.oo
In Belgium, the distribution of seals in national elections is based on the d'Hondt system
ofPR and is arrived at in two different stages. First, in each arrondissement (administrative
IS Hooghe and Rihoux, "The Green Breakthrough in the Belgian General Election of June 1999",
130.
19 Governmem of Belgium, The Constitution ofBelgium, hllp:www.fed.
parl.belconstilution_uk.html, Accessed on September 1, 2000.
60 Fitzmaurice, The Politics ofBelgium, 90-91.
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region), an electoral divisor is calculated using the largest remainder formula. Figure 3.1
demonstrates how seats are allocated in Belgium in this manner.
Figure 3.1- First Round of Allocating Seats in Belgian Parliament
Total Votes Cast - A
Seats to be Filled
For Each Party an Electoral Quotient is calculated as follows:
votes Cast for Pany List- B
A
Source: Bernard Orofinan and Arend Lijphan, £/«tMal Laws "lid n.tir Politic,,1 Constquences, 173.
The method of allocating scats in the first round is relatively straightforward. First, the
lotal number of votes cast is divided by the tolal number of seats that ace to be filled. Second, the
number of votes cast for each party is divided by the sum of votes casts, by the number of seats
that are to he filled. After this initial round of distribution, not all seats have been allocated and
some seats remain to be filled. However, only parties that have surpassed the electoral quotient
of 0.66 in at least one arrondissement are eligible to participate in the second round of seat
distribution. The allocation of scats in the second round are calculated for each list as indicated
in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2- Second Round of Allocating Seats in Belgian Parliament
Electoral QUQtient in the Arrondissement
First Distribution ofSeats +1,2,3 ...
Sou,", Bernard Grofman and Arend lijphart, EleclOrall.aw1 and Thel. Pt>lltical CaMequem:e$, 173
For eaeh qualifying party, the number of votes in the whole region is divided successively
by the number of seats already awarded plus, one, then two, then three and so Qn. The quotients
JI
are classified in descending order and seats for each party are then allocated to an arrondissement
in accordance with the size of the local quotients of that party in descending orderY This fonn
of proportional representation makes one-party government unlikely. As such, the national
government has traditionally been based on coalition building, comprised of at least two parties
from Wallonia and two from Flanders.
While the electoral system employed in national elections is beneficial to smaller parties,
the electoral fannula used in European elections is slightly more favourable to smaller parties.
Similar to national elcctions, the Belgian electorate has the option to cast their ballot in a number
of different ways.62 However, unlike in national elections, where candidates are elected from 30
different multi-member constituencies, in European elections, the number of constituencies is
reduced to three, one for Flanders and one for Wallonia, while voters living in Brussels comprise
their own constituency and have the option of voting for either a Flemish or Francophone llst of
candidates.6J A benefit of having fewer constituencies is that it enables smaller parties a better
opportunity to penetrate all areas ofthe country. Agalev and Ecolo, being less organized and
with fewer resources than larger parties, would find it more difficult in presenting a full slate of
candidates in each national constituency. While organizational problems of this nature have
become less arduous as thcy have grown in national prominence, it was prevalent during their
61 Fitzmaurice, The Politics ofBelgium, 91-92.
62 John Fitzmaurice, "Belgium", Electoral Studies, vol.8, no.3, 1989, 233.
6J Tom Mackie, "The Results of the 1989 and 1994 European Elections" in Choosing Europe?:
The European Electorate and National Politics ill the Face ofUnion, Cees van der Eijk et aI.,
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 452.
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developing years.64 European elections, however, allow smaller parties the opportunity to
overcome such problems because they can concentrate their efforts on three, as opposed (0 30
separate campaigns.
With fewer constituencies, Agalev and Ecolo also require fewer nationally. or at least
regionally, renowned candidates to head their respective party lists. In national elections, Agalev
and Ecolo would conceivably have great difficulty in recruiting enough good candidates to head
up party lists in all 30 constituencies. In national elections, the personal appeal of a popular
candidate can only be used in onc constituency, whereas in a European election, that same
candidate can be used to help the party's fortunes throughout the region and thus, may contribute
to the party winning a greater share of the vote.
While organizational problems are less contentious in European elections, some factors
exist that would conceivably make it more difficult for the Belgian Greens to win a larger share
of the vote in EP elections. One such factor involves the effective threshold a party needs to
surpass in order to win representation in both national and European elections. In Belgian
elections, the larger the number of seats available, the lower the percentage of the vote a party
needs to gamer in order to win seats.6' Due to the fact that there are more seats oontested in
national elections, one would expect a lower threshold in these elections. With a lower
threshold, it would be possible to expect that the notion of the wasted vote would be more
prevaJcnt in European elections than in national elections because it would be more difficult for
Agalevand Eoolo to pass the effective threshold in a Euro~an election. lfBelgian voters are
601 Derschouwer, "Belgium: The Eoologists and Agalev", 41.
6' Parkin, Green Parties, 169.
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cognizant of this distinction, then it would be possible to expect lhal Belgium's Green parties
would receive a larger share of the vote in national elections and not European elections.
However, ifsuch a distinction docs in fact exist, it has not had an impact on the overall
performance of the two parties in either election.
3:3 Vote Switching and Electoral Cycles in Belgian European Elections
Over the past 24 years, Agalev and Ecolo have contested eight national elections and five
EP elections. Table 3.t summarizes the electoral perfonnance of the two Green parties during
the years 1977-1999. Table 3.1 also shows thai Agalcv and Ecolo have consistently received a
larger share afthe VOlc in European elections than in national elections. The only exception to
this tendency occurred in 1994, when Ecolo won a smaller percentage of the vote compared to
the 1991 national election.
Table 3.1- Agalev and Ecolo Electoral Results in National and European Elections, 1977-
1999
A alev Ecolo
National Elections European Elections National Elections European Elections
1977 0.3 1979 2.3 1977.. 1.1 1979-t> 5.1
1978 0.7 1984 4.4 1978.. 3.7 1984 3.9
1981 3.9 1989 7.6 1981 2.2 1989 6.3
1985 3.7 1994 6.7 1985 2.5 1994 4.8
1987 4.5 1999· 7.5 1987 2.6 1999· 8.4
1991 4.9 1991 5.1
1995 4.4 1995 4.0
1999 7.0 1999 7.4
Sou=: Table constructed from Neil Yrt.... "The Greens in the lm EUfQJlCan Parliamentary EJections~Envirommlll,,1 Po/ilia,
'101.8,110.4. 161, Kris fkrschouwu, ··Belgium: The Eo:ologiSls and Agalev" in Ferdinand MuJler-Rommc:J, ed.• New Politics i"
Weste.... EuroJH: Tlte Rise ""d SlICt:e", ofG,wm P"nies ,,"" AlterIWtiYe LislS. 41, Marc Hooglte and Benoit Rihoux. "'The Groen
IJreakthfQugh in the 6elgian Qeneral E1eclionofJune lm".E"vfro"me"toIPo/ilics,VQI.9,no.3.130.andOsI<arNiederma}'<'r,
"EuropeanElectilNlsI989"EuropeanJou,,,oiojPoliliCIJIReseorch,VQ1.19.no.l, 149
a·WaJlonieE<.:ologie b-EuropeEoologie
°Elections held conourrently.
It is important to remember lhat the manner in which voters cast a ballot for a particular
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party in a European election may depend on where that election falls within the national electoral
cycle. On one occasion, the 1979 EP election occurred in the early stages of the Belgian
govemmem's mandate, on three other occasions (1984, 1989. 1994), the European elections took
place during the lale stages afthe electoral cycle, while in 1999, the European election was held
simultaneously with the national election. Tables 3.2 to 3.6 shows the percentage afme vOle
cast for Belgian parties that contested national and European elections from 1978 to 1999. The
tables also indicate the gains and losses incurred by parties in EP elections compared to their
performance in preceding national elections and ranks these parties in accordance with these
gains or losses.
1979
The first European election occulTed just six months after the last national election of
OC<:cmber 1978. Moreover, the formation of a coalition government, comprised of the CVP,
PSC, SP, PS, and FDF had not been fonnally announced until April of 1979.66 Thus, thc 1979
European election was conducted a mere two months after the government had been fomled,
leaving little time for the Belgian electoratc to have become dissatisfied.
66 Paul Claeys, Edith de Graeve-Lismont and Nicole Loeb-Mayer, "Belgium" in Ten European
Elections: Campaigns and Results ofthe 1979/8/ First Direct Elections to the European
Parliament, Karlheinz Reif, cd., Aldershot: Gower Publishing, 1985,37.
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Table 3.2- Performance of Belgian Parties in tbe 1979 European Electioo- Compared to the
1978 National Eledion* (Gains and losses in ~o
Flanders 1979EE 1978NE Gains or Losses
CYP.. 29.5 26.1 +3.4
Agalcv 2.3 0.7 +1.6
SP. 12.8 12.3 +(l.5
PVV-b 9.4 10.3 ·0.9
VU 5.9 7.0 -2.1
Wallonia 1979 EE 1978 NE Gains or Losses
Ecologie 5.1 3.7 +1.4
PRL.> 6.8 5.9 +(l.9
FOF.. 7.6 7.0 +0.6
PSC.. 8.1 10.1 -2.0
PS-a 10.5 13.0 -2.5
Source, KarlhcllIz Re1f, cd. Ten £urtJfH'an E/ewoM,202.
·PcrcmlagescompooedofrWionalandnolregionalpercenlllgl:$. OIh.... FIemi.<handWal1on;anpar1ies,1979EP,2,1)01O.I97S
NE:3.9"/o.
... Governing panies. I>- Principal flppm;tion parties.
In the 1979 European election, three members afthe governing coalition, the CVP, SP,
and FDF actually made gains compared with their pcrfonnancc in the 1978 national election.
Amongst smaller parties, both Agalev and Ecolo made the largest gains. Agalev gained 1.6
percent and in Flanders, this gain was second only to the CVP. Gains made by Europe Ecologie,
at 1.4 percent were the largest made by any party in the Walloon region.
1984
The 1984 European election OCCUlTed more than halfway through the mandate of the
Chrislian Demoerats and Sociali~ts, who had fonned a coalition govemment shortly aftcr lhe
1981 national election. Unlike in 1979, the governing parties were not the beneficiaries ofa
post-election euphoria, and would have been expected to sutTer some losses in comparison to
their perfonnance in the last national election.
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Table 3.3· Performance of Belgian Parties in the 1984 European Election· Compared to Ibe
1981 National Election· (Gains and Losses in %)
Flanders 1984 EE 1981NE Gains or Losses
SP. 17.1 12.4 +4.7
Agalev 4.3 2.4 +1.9
CVP... 19.8 19.3 t{).5
VB 1.3 1.I +0.2
VU 8.5 9.8 -1.3
KPB 0.4 2.3 -1.9
PVV.. 8.6 12.9 -4.3
Wallonia 1984EE 1981 NE Gains or Losses
Ecolo 3.9 2.4 +1.5
PRL 9.4 8.6 +0.8
PS 13.3 12.7 +0.6
PSC 7.6 7.1 t{).5
PCB l.l 2.3 ·1.2
FDF-RW 2.5 4.2 -1.7
S<lur«: Table conStnll'tW from Derek Hear! Vld Christopher Rudd, "The Belgian Generol Election of 19B]: A PTdiminaJY
Repo,,",E/ectoraISiwdies,voLI,no.l,1982, I02andGuidl,l,,,,,der Bcrghc, "Belgium" Eleclorol Sludlc$, vol.3, 00.3, 19S4,
267
• Percentagel; ba$ed on natil)flal andregiOllal figurcs. Othel'l'lcmishandWal1onianpanies,1984EP:2.2·~1981NE2.5% .
... O<!vem;ngpw1irs. b-principaloppmitionpartics
Despite being a mid-term evaluation, several larger parties, including several members of
the governing coalition, actually made gains from the 1981 national election. Amongst the
smaller parties listed in Table 3.3, Agalev and Ecolo once again made the largest gains. Agalev
gained 1.9 percent from the \981 national election, second only to the principal opposition party,
the SP. The gains made by Ecolo, at \.5 percent, once again was the largest gains of any party in
Wallonia.
1989
In 1989, the European election took place a little morc than 18 months after the last
national election that had been held in December 1987, and can be oonsidered a mid-term
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evaluation. By this time, a considerably greater segment afthe Belgian electorate wouJd
potentially transfer their yotes from larger to smaller parties. Similar to the 1984 EP elections,
Belgium's governing parties would once again be unlikely to benefit from a honeymoon period
with the electorate.
Table 3.4- Performance of Belgian Parties in Ibe 1989 European Election· Compared to the
1987 National Election* (Gains and Losses in %)
Flanders 1989 EE 1987 NE Gaios or Losses
Agalev 7.6 4.5 +3.1
VaamsBlok 4.1 1.9 +2.2
CVP.• 21.1 19.5 +1.6
PVDA OA 0.8 -0.4
PVV-lo 10.6 11.5 -0.9
SP. 12.4 14.9 -2.5
VU. SA 8.0 -2.6
Wallonia 1989£E 1987 NE Gains or Losses
Ecolo 6.3 2.6 +3.7
FDFIRW I.5 1.2 +1.3
PSc.. 8.1 8.0 +{U
PTB 0.2 0.2 0.0
POS 0.2 0.2 0.0
PCB 0.5 0.8 -0.3
PS. 14.5 15.7 -1.2
PRL. 7.2 9A -2.2
Source: Osbr Nicdermayu, "European Elections 1989" E~roJHa~ Journal afPoliltCal Reuarc!t, vol 19, no I, 149
• Pe~entagl:S based on national and regional figures. Other Flemish lllId Wallonian panies, 1984 EP: 2.2%, 1981 NE 2.5 %.
a-Govemingparties. b-principaloppositionpartiell
From Table 3.4, it is clear that the 1989 European clection in Belgium can be classified as
a second-order election in the manner in which Reif and Schmitt predicted. Unlike the 1979 and
1984 EP elections, most of the larger parties this time experienced losses from the preceding
national election in 1987. However, unlike in 1979 and 1984, this anti·govemment swing was
not to the benefit of Belgium's principal opposition parties. Instead, it was spread out amongst
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smaller parties including Agalev and Ecolo. In Flanders, Agalev gained 3.1 percent from what
they had garnered in the 1987 national election. This was also the largest gain made by any pany
in the Flemish region. Ecole's share of the yote in the 1989 election increased slightly more than
Agalev's, jumping 3.7 percent and, for the third consecutive EP election, made the largest gains
of any party in Wallonia..
1994
The 1994 European election took place more than halfway through the mandate of the
Belgian government and can be considered a mid-leon evaluation. By this time. a considerably
greater segment of the Belgian electorate would switch from the party they voted for in the 1991
national election and the party they would vole for in the 1994 EP election.
Table 3.5· Performance of Belgian Parties in the 1994 European EJection" Compared to the
1991 National Election" Gains and Losses in %
F1anders 1994 EE 1991 NE Gaios or Losses
Agalev 6.6 4.9 +1.7
VB 7.8 6.6 +1.2
SP. 12.0 10.9 +1.1
CVP.• 17.0 16.8 +0.2
VLD... 11.4 12.0 -0.6
VU 4.4 5.9 -1.5
Wallonia 1994 EE 1991 NE Gains or Losses
FN 2.9 1.7 +1.2
Ecolo 4.9 5.1 -0.2
PRUFDF... 9.1 9.6 -0.5
PSc.. 7.0 7.7 -0.7
PS. 11.4 13.5 -2.1
Source:Elec/oro/Sludi"..,vol,11,no,1.1991, 18$ and John Fil>;mauTiee. "Belgium". fileclora/S/lJdies. vol.13. no.4, 1994,333
• PeTCentoge. based on national and regional figures. OtherFlemiohandWalionianparties.1984EP:2.2%.19S1NE2,$%
a-Governinsparties. b-principaloppo.ilionpartie.
The 1994 EP election was one thai brought mixed results for Belgium's Green parties.
For Agalcv, Ihe party gained 1.7 percent from the 1991 national election and, for the second
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consecutive EP election, made the largest gains of any party in Flanders. In Wallonia, Ecolo
failed to benefit from a widespread protest vote thai tcnded to punish larger parties. Most oflhe
protest vole went to the far right extremist party, the Front NationaL Instead of gaining support
from the previous national election, as had been the case in the 1979, 1984, and 1989 EP
elections, Ecolo actually experienced a loss, dropping from 5.1 percem in 1991, to 4.9 percent in
1994. This results is surprising for two reasons. First, Ecolo's perfonnance does not fil Reif and
Schmitt's proposition that small parties will gain in a second-ordcr election. Secondly, the 1994
EP election took place in the late stages orlhe Belgian national election cycle, a period when
voting for a party like Eco10 would be expected to be more pronounced.
1999
The 1999 EP eledion was held concurrently with the national election. In this case,
smaller parties would not be expected to make large gains because protest voting would make
little sense under these circumstances. Instead, gains made by smaJler parties in this type of
situation would be out of purely expressive voting, in which voters are freed from any concerns
of govenunent formation.
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Table 3.6- Performance of Belgian Parties 10 the 1999 European Election- Compared to the
1999 National Election· Gains and Losses in %)
Flanders 1999 EE 1999 NE Gains or Losses
VU 7.6 5.6 +2.0
Agalev 7.4 7.0 +0.4
CVP. 13.9 14.1 -0.2
VB 9.4 9.9 ·0.5
SP. 9.0 9.6 -0.6
VLD_b 13.5 14.3 -0.8
Wallonia 1999 EE 1999NE Gains or Losses
Ecolo 8.3 7.3 +1.0
FN 1.6 1.5 +0.1
PRL-FDF~ 10.0 \0.\ -0.1
P5-. 9.6 10.1 -0.5
PSC 5.1 5.9 -0.8
Source, University ofDilsseldorf, POrlie.and £/ulimu in EllI'Op;!,http public.r7..uni-duessdorf.deI-nordsview/index.html
and 10hn FitzmaUlicc, '"The Belgian Elttl;onsof 131une 1999" West EUr(J~a" Politics. ",,1.23. no.l, 2000, 175
• Ptfcentages based on national and regional figures. Other Flemish and Wallonian p3J1ies, 19S4 EP: 2.2%, 1981 NE 2.5 %
a.Govemingparties. b-principaloppositionparties.
From the table above, it is clear that the governing groups, the Socialists and Cluistian
Democrats, along with the principal opposition, the Liberals, suffered losses in both Flanders and
Wallonia. As such, an increase for smaller parties was evident in both regions. In Flanders,
Agalcv made the second largest gains, second only to Volksuflie. However, at OA percent, Ihis
was Ihe smallest gain made by the party in any European election up to this point.
In Wallonia, Ecolo's share oflhe vote in the 1999 EP election rebounded from its dip in
the 1994 EP election as they gained 1.0 percent from the percentage of the vote they claimed in
the concurrent nationaJ eleclion. As had been the case in 1979, 1984, and in 1989, Ecolo made
the largest gains of any party in the region.
Tables 3.2 to 3.6 indicale that with the exception of Ecolo in 1994, Belgium's two Green
parties have consistently done better in European elections than they have in preceding national
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elections. This suggests that the results tend to follow in accordance with the second-ordcr
election model, where smaller parties receive a greater share of the Yote in EP elections than in
the preceding national election.
Analysis of the three EP elections that have been held during the mid/1ate stages indicates
that Agalev has made an average gain of 1.9 percent. In the one EP election held in the early
stages of the national election cycle, Agalev made a gain of 1.6 percent, and in the concurrent
election, a gain of 0.4 percent. While the difference between gains made by Agalev in elections
held in the early stages and those held during the mid or late stages is marginal, the results still
comply with the election cycle model. In the case of Ecolo, the Wallonian Greens have made an
average gain of 1.7 percent in the three elections held during the mid/late stages. In the one early
stage EP election. Eco10 made a gain of 1.4 percent and in 1999, Ecolo made a gain of 1.0
percent. Analysis of the results indicate that, at 0.7 percent, differences in results between the
three stages, while marginal, leaves the study to conclude thai like their Flemish counterparts,
gains made by Ecolo also fit in accordance with the election cycle model.
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Chapter 4
France: Les Verts
4: 1 An Electoral History of the French Greens
The French environmental movement has long been involved in national electoral politics
and like their cohorts in Belgium and Gennany. they 100 CUJTCTltly find themselves in the position
of being a coalition partner in the national government. Similar to other Green parties in western
Europe, the electoral history of Les Verts has been onc marked by a series of electoral
disappointments and on several occasions, they have been forced to compete with rival Green
parties.
While the French Greens have participated in electoral politics since the 1974 presidential
election, they were slow to organize into a pennanent political party. It was not until the latc
19705, that ecologists in France finally came to the realization that contesting nationaJ elections
was necessary in order to promote green ideas and issues. The first ecologist party in France was
fonned in 1977 by a series ofecological groups who established a proto-party known as Collectif
Ec%gie 78'. The primary purpose ofCE 78' was to present candidates in the 1978 French
national election. Campaigning with the goal ofeducating the French electorate about the
importance ofenvironmental issues, CE 78' attracted 201 candidates and polled 2.2 percent of the
vote. The results were disappointing because CE 78' had hoped to draw much support from the
considerable portion ofthc French electorate who opposed France's nuclear energy industry.
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Shortly after the 1978 national election the party disbanded.!>?
The 1979 EP elections offered the French Greens another opportunity 10 better their poor
showing in the 1978 national election. An umbrella group similar to CE 78', labeled Europe
Ecologic, improved on the results of CE 78' by claiming 4.4 percent of the vOle. This was the
best showing of any Green party in the 1979 European elections. However, despite this
perfonnancc, they did not win any seats because they fell short aCthe 5 percent threshold
required under French electoral law. As had been the case in 1978, with the passing oflhe 1979
EP election, Europe Ecologie ceased to operate as a party. U
In 1981, French ecologists once again established a temporary political party in time for
the 1981 national election. This proto-party, labeled Aujourd hui' Ecologie, failed to leave mueh
of an impression with the electorate. Similar to earlier campaigns, the primary goal ofAujourd
hui' Ecologie was to educate French voters about the salience of environmental issues.
However, lhe party mustered only 1.1 percent of the votc on the first ballot. As had been the case
in 1978, no candidate garnered enough support to pass on to the second round and once again
failed to win any seats in the National Assembly.69
While temporary political parties had been established for the 1978 and 1981 national
elections, and the 1979 European election, the French environmental movement was late in
67 Jeff Bridgeford, "The Ecological Movement and the French General Election of 1978",
Parliamentary Affairs, voUI, no.3, 1978,317.
61 Bomberg, Green Parties and Politics in the European Union, 84,
69 Brendan Prendiville, "France:" Les Verts" in New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise and
Success a/Green Parties and Alternative Lists, Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, ed., London:
Westview Press, 1989, 89.
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establishing a pennanenl political party. As in other countries, there had been some debate about
the merits of creating such an outlet within the French political arena. Despite some reservations,
Les Verts, France's primary ecologist party, was established in 1984.70 Unlike other parties that
have competed in French elections under a 'green label', Les Verts have been noled for ils 'pure'
green ideology. Standing on principles of 'autonomy, ecology and solidarity', Les Verts has
traditionally tried to keep its distance from adopting pragmatic practices towards politics.11
The 1984 European election marked the first time that Les Verts contested a nationwide
election. However, the 1984 election served as yet another bitter disappoinunent for French
ecologists. This was due 10 the fact that Les Verts had been forced 10 compete with a rival Green
list, the Entente Radicale Ecologiste. Despite attempts at fonning a common list between the
two parties, consensus could not be reached due to deep ideological differences.n With two
competing lists, winning parliamentary representation in the European parliament became even
more difficult. The results illustrated the costs of factionalism as Les Verts polled 3.4 percent of
the vote while the ERE polled 3.3 percent. If the two parties had amalgamated, they would have
in all likelihood, garnered enough support to surpass the five percent threshold, and elected
France's first Green MEP'S.73
In the 1986 national election, Les Verts had hoped that they could finally make the
breakthrough they had been looking for sincc their inception. This sense ofoptimism was due to
70 John Frears, Parties and Voters in France, New York: St. Martin's Press. 1991. 106.
71 O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe. 183.
n Bamberg. Green Parties and Politics in the European Union. 90.
13 O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 187.
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the facl that it was the first, and only occasion, during the course afthe Fifth Republic, that
proportional representation was used in a national election.7~ Under more favourable electoral
conditions, Les Verts aspired to finally win representation in the National Assembly. Despite
their expectations, Les Verts suffered a tremendous electoral setback by garnering just 1.2
percent of the vote. Even though PR was used in this ejection, their disappointing showing can
be attributed to the fact that voters still perceived a vote for the Greens as a wasted ballot."
After the disappointment of the 1986 nalional election, there was speculation thaI the Les
Verts would disband. While the party did present a candidate for the 1988 presidential election,
Les Verts made the explicit decision not to contest the parliamentary elections of that same year.
The only grounds they gave for boycotting this election was that they felt it was not necessary to
contest every election in order to confinn their existence as a political party.1~
While most of the I 980s was a disappointment for France's Green parties, the 1989 EP
election proved to be one of the best perfonnances for the French Greens. In this election, Les
Verts did not have to compete for votes with rival Green parties. They secured an impressive
10.6 percent of the popular vote and more importantly, captured nine seats and entered the
European Parliament for the first time.n
Confident in the wake of their success in the 1989 European election, Les Verts, in
7. Frears, Parties and Voters in France, 181-182.
n O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 187.
1~ Frears, Parties and Voters in France, 108-109.
n Nick Hewlett, Modern French Politics: Analyzing Canflict and Consensus Since 1945,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1989, 82; Anne Stevens, The Government and Politics ojFrance, New
York: SI. Martin's Press, 1996,264.
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conjunction with another Green party, Generation Ecologie fonned an electoral aJliance. This
party, unlike the fundamentalist Les Verts, look a much morc pragmatic approach to electoral
politics. Together, these two parties contested the 1993 national election under the banner
Entente Ecologiste. Their alliance was built around a strategy that attempted to concentrate on
constituencies that they considered winnable.7' Despite garnering 7.8 percent of the national
vote, their strategy proved fruitless, as only two of their 547 candidates passed on to the second
round of balloting and neither candidate was elected.79
Like many other Green parties throughout Western Europe, the history ofLes Verts is one
that has been marked by internal divisions and competition from other Green parties. As a result
of Ihis, the French Greens have at times, been their own worst enemies. These problems can be
no bettcr illustratcd than during the 1994 EP election. Unable to agree on a campaign alliance
and split over the issue of European integration, Generation Ec%gie and us Verts presented
separate lists. so With two Green parties to choose from, potential Green party supporters
subsequently split their votes between Les Verts and GE. Generation Ec%gie polled a mere 2
percent oflhe popular vote while Les Verts oblained 2.9 percent." What made the results oflhe
1994 EP election allihe more discouraging was the fact that their splilled to the Greens losing
all nine seats that they had won in the 1989 EP election.
7lI O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in COlllemporaryEurope, 195-197.
19 Andrew Appleton, "Parties Under Pressure: Challenges to Established French Parties", West
European Politics, vol.18, no.1, 59.
so Ibid., 61.
!1 Ibid.,61.
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The defeat in the 1993 national election, coupled with the loss of all of their seats in the
1994 EP election, provided Les Verts with the impetus for adopting a more pragmatic approach
to electoral politics. For years, the party had contemplated allying themselves with the Socialists.
The decision to take such an approach had been considered throughout much of the 19805 and
1990s. However, the French Green movement had long been suspicious of the PS. This was
especially true during the tenure of the 1981-1986 govenunent of Francois MiUerand • when the
PS continued to pursue polices of unchecked economic growth, while also supporting nuclear
energy programs. Despite these longstanding reservations. the French Greens finally endorsed an
electoral alliance with the Socialists in time for the 1997 national election. The electoral pact
agreed upon would saw the PS withdraw candidates in 29 constituencies. In exchange, Les Verts
and Generation Ecologie agreed not to campaign against the PS in 77 districts. This alliance
proved beneficial for both Green parties. Combined, they captured 4.1 percent of the national
vote and more importantly, entered the National Assembly for the first time by winning seven
seats. An additional bonus to the French Green movement came in the form ofan invitation to
become coalition partners in the Jospin government. This achievement marked the first time that
a Green party had become members in a governing coalition.!l
Hoping to build on their successes in the 1997 national election, France's two Green
parties once again presented a common list in time for the 1999 European election. This alliance
once again proved to be beneficial. Combined, the two parties captured 9.7 pereent ofthe vote
and reclaimed all nine seats that they had lost after the debacle of the 1994 European election.v
32 O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 206-208
8J Carter, "The Greens in the 1999 European Parliament Elcctions", 162.
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The French Greens have made considerable progress from their early, marginal role in
French electoral politics. Similar to die Grlinen in Germany, and Agalev and Ecolo in Belgium,
Les Verts and Generation Ecologic are currently members of a national governing coalition.
Whether they can enlarge their electoral support depends largely on the circumstances that
prevail in national politics during their tenure as members of the current French government. In
European elections, they should have little trouble in continuing to win seats, provided electoral
alliances continue to be forged between the two Green parties.
4.2 The French Electoral System
Prior to the establishment of the Fifth Republic, the French party system had been marked
with instability and severe fragmentation. When framing the constitution of the Fifth Republic,
General Charles de Gaulle insisted that in order to avoid the shortcomings of the electoral
systems of the Third and Fourth Republics, the implementation of certain precautions would be
imperative. Dc Gaulle contended lhal because of the employment of proportional representation,
the National Assembly had become immobilized and dominated by small parties.W
In an effort to avoid the problems associated with a fragmented party system, the national
electoral system introduced by De Gaulle confronts smaller parties with considerable obstacles.
One of the most problematic obstacles for smaller parties is the majoritarian double-ballot
system. A well known effect of the majoritarian system is that smaller parties have a greater
W Vincent Wright, The Government alld Politics ofFrance, London: Hutchinson, 1986, 16.
49
tendency to be defeated.8S This system has been used in national elections in France since 1958.
The only exception to this came in 1986, when the French government temporarily dropped the
double ballot system in favour of proportional representation. This measure had been introduced
by Francois Mitterand's Socialists Party because they were concerned that the double ballot
would severely hinder the party's chances of being reelected. Immediately after the 1986
election, the Mitterand government reintroduced the double ballot system and it has been
employed ever since.~
The double ballot majorilarian system requires two rounds orvoting. On the first round
of balloting, only candidates who obtain a majority of votes, comprising one quarter of all
registered voters, arc elected,I7 If a candidate receives such a majority on the first ballot, there is
no need for a second round of voting. However, due to the number ofparties that contest
elections in France, such incidents are rare. In the 1993 national election for example, only 80
out of 577 constituencies elected a candidate on the first ballot.u
Prior to 1978, French electoral law stipulated that only two candidates could pass on to
the second round of balloting. However, since that time, more than two candidates are pctmitted
to advance to the second round, provided the candidate obtains a minimum of 12.5 percent of all
"Duverger, Political Parties, 204-205.
Il6 Frears, Parties and Voters in France, 185.
17 Matthew Cossolotto, European Politics: 1995, Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc.,
1995,101.
n David M. Farrell, Comparing Electoral Systems, London: Prentice Hall, 1997,41.
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registered voters.S'! As Table 4.1 indicates, while it is common 10 require a second round of
balloting, up until the 1997 national election, it was extremely rare for more than two candidates
to be placed on the ballot in the second round.
Table 4.1- Second Round Ballots in National Elections with more than two Candidates,
1978-1997'"
Election Year
1978
1981
1988
1993
1997
Number of Second Round Second Round Ballots with
Ballots More than two Candidates
418 I
320 I
442 8
483 15
548 79
Sou/U: D B Goldey, ~ThcFRnch Ckncral Elc<:t1on of25 May 1 June 1997" EleclorolSlud,es, vol.t7, noA, 1998, 146
·Nole:1986nationaldeclionconduc(edunderproponionalr~sentalion.
While the campaign leading up to the first round of balloting gives the French Greens an
opportunity to publicize their political platfonn, they tend to fall by the wayside as larger panies
are the ones that usually pass through to the second round. As such. voting for the Greens is
often considered a nominal gesture that usually only oeCtlJ"S in the first round. An interesting
feature of this system is that it has come to effectively impose a modified primary system
between the major parties on the left and the right. This is because the two leading candidates
who usuaJly meet in the second round ofbal1oting often represent the major panics ofthe left and
right, a tradition that has come to dominate French electoral politics.90
In subsequent runoff elections held a week after the first ballot, the choice for French
voters is narrowed to two. or sometimes. three candidates. No new candidates are pennilloo on
8'l Alistair Cole and Peter Campbell. French Electoral Systems and Elections Since J789,
Aldershot: London, 1989, 191.
90 Cossolotto, European Politics, 101.
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the second ballot and each candidate must surpass the 12.5 percent threshold in order to be
placed on the second ballot. However, ifonly onc candidate surpasses the threshold, then the
candidate that came in second on the first ballot is permined to pass on through to the second
round. In the second round of balloting, the candidate that wins the most votes is declared the
winner.91
While national elections have proven arduous for small parties like the Greens to enjoy
much electoral success, the rules involving European Parliamentary elections has offered a much
more conducive environment for small party success. This is because of the electoral system that
is used. Unlike in national elections, seats in EP elections are allocated on the basis of
proportional representation. Proportional representation on the other hand, encourages a multi-
party system and thus, the French Greens have a better opportunity to win representation and
gamer a larger percentage of the vote. The success of the French Greens in the 1989 and 1999
European elections, for example, appears to have been a consequence of the electoral system.
However, it is still important to note that the electoral systcrn has at times, been inconsequential
in having an effect on the percentage of the vote that the Greens have won. For example, in the
1986 national election, Les Verts could still only muster 1.2 percent of the national vote even
though proportional representation was employed.
While the two electoral systems are different, there are common features in both systems
that are more conducive to smaller parties in European elections. One such similarity is the
surpassing of electoral thresholds that is necessary in order to win parliamentary representation.
Under the PR system, a five percent threshold is required in order to win any seats and is much
91 Frears, Partiesa/ld Voters in France, 167.
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easier to surpass than the 12.5 threshold that is present in national elections.
A further benefit 10 smaller parties in European elections is that it is much casier to
present themselves as national parties. To elaborate, it is much easier for smaller partics to field
a full slate of candidates in European elections than national elections. In European elections.
France is made up of onc large nationwide constituency. As such, each party only has to present
onc list with a maximum of 87 candidates, one for each seat that has been allocated 10 France in
the EP. In national elections however, the French Greens would require 577 candidates in order
to field a full slate. As Table 4.2 illustrates, Ihis is a feat that the French Greens have never been
able to accomplish.
Table 4.2-Green Candidates in National [Iections as a Percentage of Contested Seats·,
1978~1997
Scats Number of Candidates Percentage of Seats
Contested
1978 474 199 42.0
198\ 474 167 35.2
1986 555 34 6.1
1988 555 40 7.2
1993 555 547 98.6
1997 555 412 71.4
Source: O.B. Goldey, "The French General Eleclion of25 May.l June 1997" Elecuwal Studies, vo1.17, no.4, 1998,544
°Mctropolilan Fl'\lI1ceonly.
Thus, it is obvious that in national elections, many voters in France cannot vole for the
Greens for the simple reason that no Green candidate is running in their district. As Table 4.2
indicates, in each national election that the French Greens have presented candidates, a
significant percentage of the electorate has not been given the opportunity to vote for a Green
party candidate. In European elections, smaller parties like the Greens arc, in theory, on an even
level with larger, more established parties in the sense that all voters have at least the opportunity
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to vote for the Greens. A party may receive a small share of the vote because of organizational
problems associated with nol running full slate of candidates. In European elections however,
these problems are more easier to solve and they stand a better chance in winning a larger share
of the vote because of it.
4:3 Vote Switching and Electoral Cycles in French European Elections
Since 1978, the French Greens have contested six national elections and five European
elections under various party labels. Table 4.3 summarizes the pcrfonnance of the French
Greens in elections during the years 1978-1999. Table 4.3 also indicates that the French Greens
have consistently received a greater share oflhe vote in European elections than in national
elections. The only anomaly to this tendency occurred in the 1994 EP election, when the Greens
won a smaller percentage of Ihe vote than in the 1993 national election.
Table 4,3-Frencb Green Party Vote Percentage in National and European Elections; 1978-
1999
1978
1981
\986
\988
1993
1997
National Elections
2.8.,
l.l ..
1.2
0.4
7.6..
6.8..
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
European Elections
4."-
6,7-4
10.6..
4.9-4
9.7..
50wrce Table ~onslru~led from Florence Fau~h(1", Is TI>tre Hope for lhe Fren~h Ecology MOverntnl?·', E~'''OfIme1l/al Polmcs,
"01.7, no,3, 48 and Neil Caner, "The Grctl1S in !he 1999 European Parliamenl Elections", E~viro~me1l/al POlilics, ,,0]'8, 00.4,
1999,162.
a- CE'78 b- Europe Ecologie e-Aujourd hui Ecologie d·No allian~e. aggr~galed lotal. 1984-les V~n!i 3.4, ERE 3,3; 1994-
LesVcns2.9,GE2.0 c-Combinedlist.
France is no different from any other EU country in Ihal a segment of ils electorale
chooses to vote for one party in a national election. but votes for another party in a European
election. Due 10 the faclthat many French voters are inclined to vote differently in European
'4
elections than in national elections. larger parties and in particular. governing parties, are
susceptible to losing support to smaller parties. Tables 4.4 to 4.8 shows the percentage of the
vote cast for French panies thai have contested national and European elections between 1978
and 1999. Each table indicates the gains and losses in EP elections as compared to the preceding
national election, and each party is listed in rank order in accordance with these gains and losses.
1979
Table 4.4- Performance of French Parties in the 1979 European Election Compared to the
1978 National Electioa Gains and Losses in %
Party 1979 EE 1978NE Gains or Losses
UDF.. 27.6 2\.4 +6.2
LesVef1S.< 4.4 2.2 +2.2
PCF-b 20.5 20.6 -0.1
LUfLCRIPSU J.l J.J -0.2
PSIMRG 23.5 24.7 -1.2
RPR. 16.3 22.6 -6.3
Others 4.6 4.'
Sou",,,. Karlhemz Rc'f, T~n European Elec/I(JIIS, 205.
a-Govcmingpanies b- Prirn:ipal OPPOSilion parties c- AsCE'7S in 1978, As Europe Ecologic in 1979.
The 1979 European election was held 15 months after the last national election that had
been held in March of 1978. Of the two coalition government parties, the UDF madc gains from
the 1978 national election, while the RPR, witnessed a loss of6.3 percent On the other hand,
France's principal opposition parties all witnessed losses. Amongst smaller panies, the
Ecologists were the only party to make gains as they jumped from 2.2 percent of the vote in
1978, to 4.4 percent in 1979. This marked a doubling of their support and a12.2 percent, was the
second largest gain made by any party in France.
1984
The 1984 European election was a mid-teon election because tbe last national election
had been held in June of 1981, and the next election did not take place until March 1986.
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Table 4.5- Performance of French Parties In the 1984 European Election Compared to tbe
1981 National Election Gains and Losses In %)
Party 1984 EE 1981 NE Gains or Losses
FN 11.0 0.2 +10.8
RPRlUDF.b 43.0 40.1 +2.9
LesVerts 3.4 1.1." +2.3
peF.. 11.2 16.1 -4.9
SP-. 20.8 37.8 -17.0
Others 10.6 4.7
So~rcr. Table cOll'llrUctod from John F"'ar$, Port!es"nd VOlers in Froncr, 181; and Anne StCvt1lS, "F ri in Dir«/ EleclwlIS
IOllteE"ropeanParliamenl: J9M,IOS
k-Go~cmingpatty. b-f'rincipal oppo$ition p;orty. ...Con!CSled by independent Grttn candidates.
As Table 4.5 indicates, it is clear that the 1984 European election in France was a classic
example of the second-order election hypothesis. The ruling parties, the PCF and SP, did lose a
considerable amount of support. In particular, the loss of support for the Socialists indicates that
a considerable segment of their \981 supporters had been willing to vote anolher party in 1984.
However, Les Verts was not the primary benefactor of this swing from the Socialists. While the
Greens did jump from 1.1 to 3.4 percent, the largest gains went instead 10 lhe Front Nationale, an
extremist right-wing party.
1989
The 1989 EP election took place one year after the last national election that had been
held in June, 1988. According to Table 4.6, it was again clear that the 1989 EP election was
consistent with the second-order election hypothesis because the ruling party did lose
considerable support to smaller parties.
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Table 4.6- Performance of French Parties in the 1989 European Election· Compared to the
1988 National Eledion* Gains and Losses in %
Party 1989 EE 1988NE Gains or Losses
LesVerts 10.6 0.4.< +10.2
CPNT 4.1 +4.1
FN 11.7 9.7 +2.0
PCF 7.7 11.3 -3.6
RPRlUDF~ 28.9 37.7 -B.8
PS. 23.6 37.5 -13.9
Others 13.4 3.4
Soura. OskarNledcrmayer, "European Ele<:l1ons 1989", European JournalojPofll.eal Reseorch,voI.l9, 19'91, 150
a-Govcrningparty. b-PTincipalopposilionparty c-ConlestedbyindependentGrffncandid31e5.
France's larger parties, the RPR·UDF and Socialists, were both victims ora sharp
decrease of support, losing 8.8 and 13.9 percent respectively. This mean! that a substantial
portion of the elcctorate was willing to vote for one of France's other parties. The greatest
benefactor of such a shill was this time the French Greens, whose share of the vole jumped from
0.4 percent in the 1988 national election to 10.6 in the 1989 EP, an increase of 10.2 percent. This
increase was also the largest gain that the French Greens have experienced to date.
1994
The 1994 EP election took place in the early stages of the national eleclOral cycle as the
last national election had been held in March of 1993. From Table 4.7, the second-order
hypothesis once again was evident as France's larger parties, the PS and UDFIRPR were
subjected to a significant drop in support. Their aggregated 40.1 percent of the vote marked their
worst perfonnance in a European election.
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Table 4.7- Performance of Frencb Parties in the 1994 European Election* Compared to the
1993 National Election· (Gains and Losses in %)
Puty 1994 EE 1993 NE Gains or Losses
Another Europe 12.3 +12.3
Radical Energy 12.0 +12.0
CPNT 4.0 +4.0
Extreme Left-c 2.7 1.7 +1.0
FN 10.5 10.5 0
PCF 6.9 9.2 -2.3
P$. 14.5 19.2 -4.7
LesVerts.. 4.9~ 10.7-<1 -5.8
UDF-RPR4 25.6 38.3 -12.7
Others 6.6 10.4
S<>~,.,.,: Table constructed from Gerard Grunberg, "Fran~~, J::/e<:lIJral Studies. vol.13, 1}O.4, 1994,337 and Electoral Studies,
,"01.l2,no.3,286.
s- Governing panies b- Principal opposition pany ~_ A~gatedMal. ~s Vens 2.9, (l"neration Ecologie 2.0.
d-EntcnleEcoklgiste e-Composed OflwO lists. Pou, I' EUTOpe des Travailleurs 8lld DcmocratiqUCCI LUllcOu.vrierc.
Despite the losses experienced by larger parties, the French Greens also experienced
losses. Combined, Les Verts and GeneratiOIl Ecologic losl5.8 from the total they had
accumulated as a combined list under the Entente Ec%gisle banner in the 1993 national
election. This in part can be explained by the fact that two new parties scored remarkably well.
The anti-Maastricht party, Majority for Another Europe, and Radical Energy, a centre-left party
led by popular candidate Bernard Tapie, garncred 12.3 and 12.0 percent respectively.
1999
The 1999 EP elcction took place halfWay through the national electoral cycle as the last
national election had been held in May of 1997. From Table 4.8, it appears that the election in
some regards was an anomaly as a second-order election.
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Table 4.8- Performance of Frencb Parties in tbe 1999 European EJection· Compared 10 the
1997 National Election· (Gains and Losses in %)
Party 1999 EE 1997NE Gains or Losses
RPF 13.0 +13.0
CPNT 6.8 +6.8
LO 5.2 +5.2
Les VertslGE.. 9.7 6.8 +2.9
ps. 22.5 23.5 -1.0
RPR. 12.8 15.7 -2.9
peF.. 6.8 9.9 -3.1
UDF. 9.3 14.2 -4.9
FN 5.7 14.9 -9.2
Others 8.2 15.0
Source Table constructed from D.D Goldey 'The F~nch Gcnmd Eltcllon on5 May 1 June 1997" Electoral SJuliles, vol.l7,
110.4, 1m, 544, and UnivCfSilyofDilsscldorf, Parries ond £Iecriom ill EurofX!, htlp:/lwww:lIwww,-public.r7..uni-
duCS5d<Jrf.dd.....omsvicwlinde>:.hrml
a_Govtmingpart;a l>-P,inc;paloppos;tionpanics
Unlike in past European elections, governing parties were not subjected to substantial
losses in support. Of particular interest is the perfonnance oflhe two Green parties. According
to the second-order hypothesis, the two parties would have been prone to a drop in support
because they were members of the government at the time of the election. In the 1997 national
election, the joint Les Verts/GE list collected 6.8 percent of the vote bm in the 1999 EP, they
garnered 9.7 percent. This gain of2.9 percent, while it may prove to be anomalous, runs contrary
to the second-order election model.
As Tables 4.4 to 4.8 indicate, in the 1979, 1984, and 1989 EP elections, the French
Greens made gains that fit the second-order hypothesis. However, on two occasions, the
perfonnance of the French Greens did not fit in accordance with the second-order election model.
In the 1994 election, the Greens experienced losses despite being in opposition and a significant
drop in support for France's major parties. The converse of this was apparent in the 1999 EP,
when the Greens were members of the goverrunent, but still made gains from the previous
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nationalelcction.
On four out five occasions, the Greens have made larger gains in EP elections compared
to their perfonnance in the previous national election. While these gains have come regardless of
when EP elections have transpired in the national election cycle, it is worth noting that the size of
these gains have depended largely on when these elections have taken place within the cycle. In
two EP elections that took place in the early stages afthe cycle, the Greens made gains of2.2 and
10.2 percent respectively, for an average gain of6.2 percent. In 1994 and 1999, two EP elections
held during mid-tenn, the Greens made gains 0£2.9 and 2.3 percent respectively, for an average
increase 0£2.6 percent. According to the election cycle hypothesis, voting for smaller parties is
supposed to be more pronounced during the mid, to late stages of the cycle. The difference in
average gains, at 3.6 percent, is significant enough to conclude that the evidence indicates that
voting for the Greens has been more evident in EP elections that have been held in the early
stages of the cycle, running contrary to the election cycle model.
6D
Chapter 5
Germany: Die Grnnen
5: 1 An Electoral History of the German Greens
The Gennan Greens have come a long way since their early beginnings. Originally die
Griinen considered themselves an "anti-party" party, different from the traditional parties and
dctennined to exploit the opportunities of Gennan electoral politics without falling into the traps
ofprofessionalization.92 However, over the course of the past twenty years, the party has slowly
evolved into a pragmatic political force which is the largest and, arguably, the most successful
Green party in Europe.
The rise of die Griinell is impressive because they were successful in carving out a niche
in a party system dominated by three parties, the CDUlCSU. gPD, and FOP, While the party
system was highly fragmented in the early years of the Federal Republic, by the 1970s, the party
system had come to be monopolized by these parties. For example, in the 1976 national election,
99 percent of the West German electorate cast ballots for one of these three parlies.9l Due to the
dominance of Germany's main parties, new parties that entered German electoral politics had
little impact on the results ofeleetions. The cntry ofthc Greens into the German national
parliament, the Bundestag in 1983 was a rare event and their emergence posed a challenge to the
n Bomberg, Green Parties and Politics in the European Union, 28.
9l Gordon Smith, ''The Changing West Gcrman Party System: Consequences of the 1987
Election", Government and Opposition, vo1.22, no.2, 1987,32.
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hegemonic stature ofGermany's established parties."
Electoral participation by the Greens represented the final stage of a process in which the
ecological movement had evolved. For years, German ecologists had focused on movement
politics and were DOt directly involved with elcctoral politics. However, with the introduction of
EP elections, the German Greens, made their Hrst effort 10 enter electoral politics. This enlry
was composed of a heterogenous alliance consisting of environmental activists, minor parties,
and alternative groups thaI came together 10 form the forerunner 10 die Gronen, the Alternative
Political Alliance (Sonstige Polillniglwg Die Griinen-SpV).91 In the ensuing 1979 EP election,
the SPY collected 3.2 percent ofthc VOIC.% While they did not win any seats, their share of the
vote was significant for a new party that was not a member ofthc established party s}'5tem.
While the German Greens failed 10 win parliamentary representation in the 1979
European election, the experience served as the catalyst to form an organized political party at
the national level By winning 3.2 pen::ent, the party secured 4.5 million deuuchmarks. They
were awarded this money because under German electoral law, any party securing a minimum
0.5 percent qualifies for campaign reimbursements from public funds!" This badly needed
,. Thomas Scarf, The German Greens: Challenging the Consensus, Providence: Oxford:
University Press, 1994, I.
tJ Robert L. PfaltzgrafT, Kim Holmes, Clay Clemens and Werner Kaltefleiter, The Greens oflVest
Germany: Origins, Stra/egies, and Transatlantic [mplica/ions, Washington: Institute for Foreign
Policy Analysis. 1983,32.
96 E. Gene Frankland, ''The Federal Republic of Germany: Die Griine,,", New Politics in Weslem
Europe: The Rise and Success ofGreen Parties and Altemalive Lists, Ferdinand Mullcr-
Rommel, ed., London Westview Press, 1989,62.
91 E. Gene Frankland, "Germany: The Rise, Fall and Recovery of Die Grunen" in The Green
Challenge: The Development ofGreen Parties in Europe, Dick Richardson and Chris Rootes,
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funding was used to help fonn die Griinen in 1980. Shortly thereafter, die Griinen contested its
first national election. In their inaugural election, the Greens only received 1.5 percent of the
vote. While their first national campaign was not impressive, they did use it as an opportunity to
voice their concerns for the environment and, as such, laid the groundwork thai would help to
expand their appeal with the Gennan electorate in future elections.9i
During the early 1980s, Gennany's established parties still had not adequately responded
to the non-materialist needs of the new post-materialist movements. The failure on the part of
the established parties to respond to growing ecological concerns helped to serve as a window of
opportunity for the Greens in the 1983 national election. Stressing environmcnlal protection and
the potential dangers of the nuclear energy industry, die Grlinen constituted the clearest
allemative to the CDUlCSU on these issues,99 On the basis of this platform, die Grlinen won 5.6
percent of the vote and more imponantly, the pany claimed 27 seats in the Bundestag. IOll lbis
achievement was significant because they were the first party since 1953 to have succeeded in
breaking into the established pany system. IGI
cds., New York: Routlcdge, 1996,26.
98 Horst Mewes, "A Brief History of the German Green Party" in The German Greens: Paradox
Be/ween Movement and Party, Margit Mayer and John Ely, cds., Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1998, 36.
99 Max Kaase, ''The West German Election General Election of March 6, 1983", Electoral
Studies, voL2, no.2, 1983, 162.
100 Frankland, "The Rise, Fall and Recovery ofdie Cronen", 29.
101 Lutz Mez, "Who Votes Green?: Sources and Trends of Green Support" in The German
Greens: Paradox Between Movemem and Party, Margit Mayer and John Ely, cds., Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1998,72.
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The success of the Gennan Greens in the 1983 Bundestag election carried over inlo the
1984 European election. However, this success did not come easily because they had to compete
with two socialist-pacifist parties, the Ecological-Democratic Party and the Peace Lisl. 101 Despite
competition from these two parties, die Griinen still did better than any other Green party in
Europe, winning 8.2 percent of the vole and claimed seven seats in the European Parliament.I(IJ
To many observers, the electoral success ofdie Gn"inen was oonsidered as a momentary
occurrence that would eventually fade. For example, the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, went
so far as to predict that they would lose all of their seats the next time thai Gennan voters went 10
the polls in a nationwide contest. I04 The 1987 national election gave die Gn/nen the chance to
prove their critics wrong and demonstrate to the Gennan electorate that they intended on
remaining in the Gennan Parliament. Not only did the Greens prove this to the chagrin of Kohl,
their 8.3 percent of the vote was good enough for the party to increase their presence in the
Bundestag from 27 to 42 scats. IOl
While die Gronen's electoral history until 1987 had been marked by steady
improvements, their showing in the 1989 EP election indicated that the Green vote had hit a
plateau of sorts. Although Green parties throughout Western Europe were the benefactors ofa
'green tide', die Gronen, who had made the most substantial electoral and political progress of
101 Wolfgang Rudig, "The Greens in Europe: Ecological Parties and the European Elections of
1984", Parliamentary Affairs, vol.38, no.I, 1985, 58.
IOJ Bomberg, Green Parries and Politics in the European Union, 90.
11)4 Karl Hugo Proys,Kohl: Genius o/the Present, Berlin: Edition, 1996,211.
10j PeterPu!zer, "The West Gennan Federal Election of25 January 1987", Electoral Studies,
vol.6, no.2, 1987, 152.
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any Groen party in Europe, did little more than retain their previous level of support. Although
the party did win 8.4 percent afthe vote, they only made marginal improvements on past
elections. I06
The 1980's was a decade in which the German Greens garnered a steady increase in
support in both national and European elections. However, Germany's first unification election
would subsequently challenge and put into question the overall viability ofthe party. The
setback that seriously jeopardized die Griinen 's place within the national political arena can be
attributed to two major factors. The first was the party's unpopular opposition to fe-unification
despite the widespread support for re-unification in both the Federal Republic and the German
Democratic Republic. Die Grilnen did not fully embrace the idea of unification and were
opposed to automatic extensions of West German economic and political principles to the former
GDR. I07
A second factor that contributed to the fall of die Griinen concerned their relationship
with their counterparts in eastern Germany, Bundis 90 (Alliance 90). The West German Greens
opposed an alliance with BUI/dis 90 prior to the first all-German election. They argued that they
did not want to amalgamate with, and dominate, their partners in the former GDR like other
parties had already done. 10' As well, Bundis 90 claimed that die Griinen 's agenda was based on a
series of different priorities that ran counter to their own platfonn. As such, a partnership
between the two parties failed to materialize in time for the election, and Ihis ran coWlter to most
106 Rudolph Hrbek. "Germany", EleclOral Studies, vol.8, no.3, 1989, 259.
107 Bomberg, Green Parties and Politics in the European Union, 30.
IOf Manfred Gortemaker, Unifying Germany:1989-1990, New York; St. Martin's Press, 1994.
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other parties who did unify.loo
Combined, these two factors seriously hurt the Greens. In West Germany, die Gnlnen
received 4.8 percent ofthe vote and because they fell below the five percent threshold, they were
denied representation in the Bundestag. This was a serious below to a party that had won 42
sealsjusl three years prior. While this was disappointing, German ecologists could find some
solace in the fact that Bundis 90 performed a little better, garnering six percent of the vote and
winning eight seats. IIO
In an effort not to repeat the mistakes of 1990, the two parties merged in 1993. With their
problems with unification seltled, and agreeing to consolidate their resources, the alliance
between the two parties resulted in the formation of Bundis 90'ldie Griinen. 111 The decision to
amalgamate the two parties was an opportunity to convince the German electorate that they were
a viable alternative. In the 1994 European election, Bundis 9O'ldie Griinen did just that by
winning 10.\ percent of the vote and claiming 12 seats, becoming the largest group in the
contingent of European Greens. 112
The 1994 national election was another opportunity for the Greens to convince the
German electorate that they were a viable aJternative. By capturing 7.3 percent of the vote and
1()9 G.E. Edwards, cd. German Political Parties: A Documentary Guide, Cardiff, University of
Wales Press, 1999, 163.
llG Thomas Poguntke, "Goodbye to Movement Politics?: Adaption ofthe German Green Party",
Environmental Politics, vol.2, no.3, 382-386.
111 Frankland, ''The Rise, Fall and Recovery of die Grunen", 38-39.
112 Bomberg, Green Parties and Politics in the European Union, 30.
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49 seats, they vaulted past the FDP as the third largest party in the legislature, III This second
strong showing on the part orlhe Greens proved that the debacle of the 1990 national election
was an anomaly rather than renecting general disillusionment with the party.
The 1998 Bundestag election brought an end 10 16 years ofgovernment under the
leadership of Helmut Kohl, it also marked the pinnacle ofdie Griinen 's rise to power.
Borrowing an idea from their French counterparts, the Greens decided 10 ally themselves with
Gerhard Schroeder and the Social Democratic Party. The decision to ally themselves with the
SPD was one that had long been supported by a majority of Green voters and factions within the
party,l14 While their share oflhe vote slipped from their 1994 totals and they lost two seats, their
consolation was an invitation to fonn a coalition government with the SPD. II ' While the 1998
national election marked the culmination of die Grlinen 's rise to power, the Greens were
reminded nine months later that voters have the potential to be volatile entities. In the 1999 EP
election, the party lost five seats an their share of the vote shrank to 6.4 percent, the lowest total
the Greens had won since the 1990 national election. 116
5:2 The German Electoral System
In 1949, when writing the Basic Law, the Constitution of the Federal Republic, the
framers paid slrict attention 10 contentions over what type of electoral system Gennany would
III Hans-Georg Betz, "Alliance 90/Greens: From Fundamental Opposition to Black-Green" in
Germany's New Politics: Parties and Is.~ues in the 1990s, David P. ConradI, Gerald Kleinfeld,
George Romoscr and Christian Soe, cds., Oxford: Berghan Books, 1995, 214.
ll~ Papadakis, "Green Issues and Other Parties: Themenklau or New Flexibility?", 82.
11.l Daniel Mittler, "Eclipse of the GennanGreens", The Ecologist, vol.29, no.8, 461.
116 Carter, "The Greens in the 1999 European Parliamentary Elections", 164.
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use in the pOSI-War period. The debate concemed whether to reinstate the proportional
representation system, or to introduce single member districts with a first-pasl-lhe-post method of
electing members to sit in the Bundestag. This notion was based on the idea thaI the FPTP
system would alleviate the problems of a fragmented party system, a problem that had plagued
the old Weimar Republic. 111 However, several political parties opposed the introduction of this
system on the grounds that it would work 10 their disadvantage. For example, at the time, the
Social Democrats had less support than the Christian Democrats and thus, were worried that a
plurality system would allow the COU the chance to govern with a majority in the legislalUre.
The SPD, in conjunction with the FDP and several other minor parties, were successful in
preventing the plurality system from being adopted.ll~
In an effort to reach consensus, a solution was enacted that saw a compromise between
adopting features from the plurality and PR electoral systems. Under German elcctorallaw, half
of the seats in the Bundestag are elected by plurality and halfby proportional representation.
This system has come to be known as the Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) system, and
combines a personal vote in single-member districts with the principles ofPR. As well, to avoid
severe fragmentation of the party system, a threshold clause is employed. Under German
electoral law, in order for a party to win representation, a party must gamer a minimum of five
percent of the vote.
Since 1953, the primary feature of the Gennan electoral system is that each voter has the
111 Geoffrey K. Roberts, Party Politics in the New Germany: London: Pintcr Publishers, 1997,
22.
lit Kathleen Sawn, "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: German Electoral Law as a Social
Choice Outcome" American Journal ofPolitical Science, vo1.37, no.4, 972.
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opportunity to cast two ballots. The first vote (Erststimme), is a personal vote, given to a
particular candidate in onc of328 single-member districts. The candidate with a plurality of
votes in each district is declared the winner oCtha! seat and half oCthe members that sit in the
Bundestag are elected in this manner. with the second ballot (Zweitstimme), voters cast ballots
for the party of their preference. These second Yotes are tabulated nationwide and parties are
allocated seats proportional to the percentage of votes they receive. If a party wins 25 percent of
the total number of second ballots, they are awarded 25 percent of all scats that are to be
allocated in this manner. Jl9
An interesting feature of the MMP system is that additional seats are awarded and the size
orthe Bundestag is temporarily expanded. This is done to ensure that each party has scats
proportional to their share ofthe vote they won. These additional seats, known as overhanging
mandates (Uberhang mandaI), are distributed according to the lists that are presented by each
party prior to the national election. 120 While this procedure appears unusual, it is a frequent
occurrence in German elections. For example, in the 1994 national election, 10 additional seats
were added to the Bundestag. m
Another interesting characteristic of the two-ballot system is that it enables voters to split
their votes strategically between different parties. Vote splitting can be defined as the practice of
whcn a votcr casts ballots for a candidate of one party on the first ballot, but votes for a different
119 Russell 1. Dalton, Politics in Germany, New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1993,
314-315.
12<1 Frankland, "The Rise, Fall and Recovery of Die Gnmen", 42.
121 Cossolotto, European Politics, 123.
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party on the second ballo!.!2! This is a practice that many voters adhere to for many different
reasons. For example, a Green party supporter may do this because they may feel that because of
the plurality system used on the first ballot, Green Party candidates have little chance of winning
and they do not want to 'waste' their Erststimme. As such, potential die Grl1nen supporters
choose a candidate from a larger party on the first ballot. As Table 5.1 indicates, die Griinen is a
party that usually falls victim to this practice.
Table 5.1·Percentafes of GreeD Party First Votes Compared witb Second Votes
Election First Voles Second Votes Difference
1980 1.9 1.5 +0.4
1983 4.1 5.6 -1.5
1987 7.0 8.3 -1.3
1990 4.4 5.0 -0.6
1994 6.5 7.3 -0.8
1998 5.0 6.7 -1.7
Average 4.8 5.8 -1.0
Source: Table constructed from Max Kaase, '11lc West Ocnnan General Election of6 March 1983" Electoral Studies, vol.2,
no.2,l983, 160; PeltT PulltT, '"The West GennanGrna'a1 EI«tion of25 January 1981" £lec/oroIStwdies, voI.6,no.2, 152; and
Pet... Pul.=, '"The German Federal Elecl;on of 1988" W~$I £~ropMn Polilies, vo1.22, no,3, 1999,246
With the exception of the 1980 election, die Grilncn has consistently won more second
votes than first votes. As Table 5.1 illustrates, it is evident that many Green voters are cognizant
of the fact thai die Grunen is unlikely to win seats on the first ballot. However, knowing that PR
is used on the second ballot Green party voters know the party has a chance better chance of
electing candidates to the Bundestag.
Conversely, voters that cast ballots for larger parties on the first ballot, 'may' lend their
second vote to smaller parties. This usually happens when parties announce coalition agreements
m &:khard Jesse, "Split-voting in the Federal Republic ofGennany: An Analysis of the Federal
Elections from 1953 to 1987", Electoral Studies, vo1.7. no.2, 1988, 115.
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prior to the election. This is done in an attempt to guarantee that the smaller party passes through
the five percent threshold. For example, in the 1998 national election, die Griinen was a
beneficiary of this practice because many SOP voters 'lent' their second ballots to the Grcens. l2J
Ifthls red-green coalition continues in future elections, die Griit/en, in all likelihood, will benefit
from SPD supporters who will 'lend' their second ballot to the Greens.
In producing highly proportional outcomes, the national electoral system makes one-party
government very unlikely and indeed it has never occurred in the history of the Federal Republic.
Governments have been coalitions and are usually very stable in nature. In the post-war era,
regime change only comes about from changes in the configuration of the coalition. 'lA
Unlike national elections, elections to the European Parliament do not involve the MMP
system. Instead, elections are conducted by solely using PRo In Ihis scnsc, it is Ihe same version
ofPR that is used in national elections. However, there are several differences in EP elections
that make these types ofelections more favourable to smaller partics like the Greens.
As in France, one obvious benefit for the German Greens is that it is mueh easier to
present themselves as a national pany. To elaborate, it is much easier for smaller parties to field
a full slate of candidates in European elections than national elections. In European elections,
Germany is composed of one large constituency and the party only has to present one list with a
maximum of99 candidates, one for each seat thai has been allocated to Germany in the EP. In
national elections however, the Greens would require at least 328 candidates in order to field a
123 O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 56.
124 Michael Keating, The Politics ofModern Europe: The State and Political Afdhorities in
Major Democracies, London: Edward Elgar, 1993,273.
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full slate. llS Due to the fact that organizational problems of this nature are a lesser concern for
die Grlinen, they have a better chance of winning a larger share aCthe vOle in European elections.
For die Griincn, a further benefit of this system is that it frees voters from the notion of
strategic voting. In the MMP system, voters may not choose die Griinen because they fear they
have little chance of winning seals on the first ballot. However, this element is not present in the
PR system and voters are less likely to waste 'waste' their votes. As such, this makes the PR
system more conducive to the Greens and the party is in a better position 10 win a larger
percentage of the vote.
5:3 Vote Switching, Electoral Cycles and European Elections in Germany
Since 1979, the Gennan Greens have contested six nationaJ elections and five European
elections. Table 5.2 summarizes the perfonnance ofdie Gninen in elections during the years
1979-1999. From Table 5.2, il is evident that the Greens have consistently received a larger
share of thc vote in European elections than in national contests. The only exception to this
tendency ocwrred in the 1999 EP election, when the Greens won a smaller percentage of the vote
compared to the 1998 national election.
Mackie, "The Results of the 1989 and 1994 European Elections", 273.
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Table 5.2- Green Partv Vote Percentage in National and [uroocan Elections' 1979·1999
National Elections European Elections
1980 1.5 1979 3.2~
1983 5.6 1984 8.2
1987 8.3 1989 8.4
1990 5.0... 1994· 10.1
1994· 7.3 1999 6.4
1998 6.7
Source. Table constructed from Fcrdmand Muller Rolmltl, Explamlng the Electoral Success ofGrecn Parties. A 00&1
National Analys;s~, Envinmme1ltal Politics, ''01.7, 00,4, 1998, 154 and Neil Carter, "The Greens in the 1999 European
ParliarnentaryEledions", Environmemal POlilics, vol.8, nu.4, 1999,161
.... ConlwedeleclionastheSPVdieGriinen
b-ln the first an German d«Iions. the Grecns I)UlIWO separate P"Tlies. In the Footnll Republic, die Grilnen wOn 4.8 per«nt of
lhc VOlt whilcin the fonnerGDR, Bundis 90' t1aimed 6.1 percent. TheoverallvOlcper«nmgeisaggresatcd.
°Europun elccfion Ileld in June. Nalionalelection held in October.
Due to the fact that national elections are not held on prescribed dates, European elections
occur during different periods of the national election cycle. On two occasions, in 1984 and
1999, they occurred in the early stages of the national election cycle. The 1994 EP election took
place just four months before the national election oftltat same year, while the only mid-term
evaluation came in the 1989 EP election. Tables S.3 to 5.6 shows the percentage of the vote cast
for German parties that have contested national and European elections between 1980 and 1999.
Each table indicates the gains and losses in EP elections as oompared to the preceding national
election and each party is listed in rank order in accordance with these gains and losses.
1984
1984 marked the first time that the German Greens contested an EP election under the die
C,.unell banner. It also was the first opportunity for Gennan voters to evaluate the perfonnance
of the national government led by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. While not a mid-tenn evaluation as
operationalized in this study, IS months bad passed since the last national election held in March
of 1983, leaving the electorate some opportunity to gauge the performance of the government.
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Table S.3 Performance of German Parties in the 1984 European Election Compared to tbe
1983 National Election Gains and Losses In 0/.)
P,rty 1984 EP 1983NE Gains or Losses
Die GrUnen 8.2 5.6 +2.6
NPD 0.8 0.2 +0.6
SPD-b 37.4 38.2 -0.8
FOP.. 4.8 6.9 -2.1
CDUlCSU 46.0 48.8 ~2.8
Others 2.8 0.3
Source: RudolrHrbe~, "Gmnany" EI«u,ral StlMita, VQl.3, no.J, 1984,280.
a_Govemingpanics.b-Principalopposirionpany
As Table 5.3 indicates, Gennany's three major parties all witnessed slight decreases in
support from the 1983 national election. With only marginal losses for larger parties, gains made
by smaller parties were also marginal. Amongst these parties, die Griinen's share afthe vote
jumped from 5.6 to 8.2 percent. This gain, a12.6 percent was the largest increase for any party.
1989
The 1989 EP election occurred midway through Helmut Kohl's second administration.
The last national election had taken place in January of 1987 and during the course of two and a
half years, voters would have become a little more critical of larger parties than they had been in
1984.
Table S.4 Performance of German Parties in the 1989 European Election Compared to the
1987 National Election Gains and Losses in %
Party 1989EP 1987NE Gains or Losses
Repilblikaner 7.1 +7.1
SPD", 37.3 37.0 +<J.3
Die Grilnen 8.' 8.3 +<J.\
FOP. 5.6 9.\ -3.5
CDUlCSU 37.7 44.3 -6.6
Others 3.9 1.3
Source:TablecoostruCtedfromThomasMackie,EuropeVOlesJ, 116ondOskarNiedermayff,"EuropcanElcctionI989",
Eurof'N11JoumalofPoIiticaIResearch,voI.l9, 19'91, 151.
a-Govemiogpartics.b- Principal oppllSilion party.
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From the table above, it is clear that the results of the 1989 EP election fall in accordance
with the election cycle model in the sense that governing parties experienced losses. The results
of the 1989 EP election was very different from the results aCthe 1984 EP election in two ways.
First, the Gennan electorate was much more critical of the governing parties, the COUlCSU and
their coalition partners, the FOP. Second, die Criinen did not make the largest gains of any party
in Germany. Unlike 1984, the Greens failed to capitalize on the losses incurred by governing
parties. As such, their share of the vote only jumped 0.1 percent with the largest gains going to
the Repiiblikancr Party, an extremist right-wing party.
1994
The year 1994 was a unique and very busy year for Gennan politics. It marked
SupcrYI-·ahler. a year in which German voters had the opportunity to cast ballots at the Land,
national and European levels of government. In addition, the 1994 European election also
marked the first time that a unified Germany would participate in a EP contest. Within the
national election cycle, the 1994 EP election took place three and a half years after the last
national election that had been held in December of 1990. However, the next national election
was imminent and the June election was held just four months before the October national
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Table 5.5 Performance of Germsn Parties in the 1994 European Election Compared to the
1990 National Election Gain~ and Losses in %
Party 1994 EP 1990NE Gains or Losses
Die Grtlnen 10,1 5.1 +5.0
PDS 4.7 2.4 +2.3
RcpUblikaner 3.9 2.1 +1.8
SPD.b 32.2 33.5 -0.7
CDU/CSU 38.8 43.8 -5.0
FOP.. 4.1 11.0 -6.9
Others 6.2 2.1
Source. Hans Dlcter Khngemann, "Germany' , Elector,1i Stud,es, voLl3, no.4, 1994,339, and Ann L Phlnl~ "The German
Political PanySyslemand the I:I«Iion50(1994", We'l £urofMt'"P<Jillics, ,"(lUg, 00.3, 19'95, 211
a·(;ovemingparties.t>.f>rincipalopposilionpany.
In Table 5.5 the CDUlCSU and FOP were once again victims orthe electorate's tendency
to vote with the 'boot' in a second-order election. Amongsl smaller parties, the PDS,
Repiiblikaner. and die Criinen all made gains. In particular, the Greens made larger gains in this
election than they had in any other EP election to date. At 10.1 percent, die Griinen doubled
their performance from the 1990 national election and made the largest gains of any party.
1999
While the 1994 EP election marked the largest gains that the Greens have made in a EP
contest, the 1999 election marked the converse. Traditionally, the German Greens received a
higher share of the vote in EP elections when compared to the preceding national election.
However, this trend had always been the case when the party had been a member of the
opposition. By 1999, the Greens had become partners of the national governing coalition and
according to the second-order election model, became subject to the possibility that they would
witness losses.
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Table 5.6 Performance ofGermao Parties in the 1999 European Election Compared to the
1998 National Election Gains and Losses in %
Party 1999 EP 1998 NE Gains or Losses
CDUlCSU-b 48.7 35.1 +13.6
PDS 5.8 5.1 ;{).7
RepUblikaner 1.7 1.8 -0.1
Die Grtlnen., 6.4 6.7 -0.3
FOP 3.0 6.2 -3.2
SPD., 30.7 40.9 -10.200,,,, 3.7 4.2
Souru: University of Dusseldorf, Particii and Elections in Europe, hap publiC.Tl.uni-duessdorf.dd-nQrdsvicw/indcx,hnnl;
and Thomas Pogunlkc, ~Gcnnany" european Jowrnal ofPolilkal Research, voL36, 0(1.3, 1999,395
Nine months after becoming a partner in the SPD led coalition. the Greens were reminded
that voters can be highly volatile. While only a short period of time had passed since the last
national election, the Greens were not granted a reprieve by the electorate. While the party had
gained 6.7 percent oflhe vote in the September 1998 national election, they were only successful
in winning 6.4 percent in the 1999 EP election, a decrease of 0.3 perecnt. At first glance, this
drop in support does not seem all that significant, especially oompared to the losses incurred by
their SPD coalition partners. However, the Greens prior to 1999 had always won a larger share
of the vote compared to the preceding national election. Instead of enjoying their status as a
smaller party as they had in previous EP contests, the electorate instead lodged a protest vote of
sorts against the Greens. The results of the election as it relates to the new position that the
Greens find themselves in, is in acoordance with the national election cycle model.
While the Gennan Greens have made gains in EP elections regardless of when they have
occurred in the election cycle, it is interesting to note that the size of these gains has depended on
when they occur in the cyele. In two EP elections that took place in the early stages of the cycle,
the Greens made gain of2.6 percent and a loss 0.3 percent. This marks an average gain of 1.2
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percent. In the two EP elections held in the mid and late stages of the cycle, the Greens have
made gains orO.1 and 5.0 percent, for an average gain of2.6 percent. These findings leaves the
study to conclude that gains made by the Greens has been in the latc stages of the national
election cycle and is in compliance with the election cycle model.
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Chapter 6
Great Britain
6.1 An Electoral History of the British Green Party
Great Britain has onc of the best organized and widely supported cnvironmenlal
movements in EuropC. 126 However, if widespread concern for the environment is considered an
indicator of support for a Green party, then the electoral history of the British Green Party can be
considered paradoxical. In comparison to Green parties throughout western Europe, the electoral
history of the British Green Party is one marked by few successes.
Although the oldest Green party in Europe, the British Greens were slow to develop into
a conventional political pany. This can be attributed to the fact there are few incentives for the
creation of new political parties in Great Britain. The primary deterrence to new political parties
is due to the fact that the British electoral system is based on the plurality system. As such,
because electoral success under this method is unlikely, many environmental activists have
argued that electoral politics should have been avoided. A political party, it was insisted, would
be viewed negatively by the British government and it would jeopardize their position within the
sphere of influence. 12? Despite these concerns, the British Green Party was fonnally incorporated
as a political party in 1973 and were originally known as PEOPLE. 121
126 John McCormick, British Politics and the Environment, London: Earthscan, 1991,34.
127 Chris Rootes, "Environmental Consciousness, Institutional Structures and Political
Competition in the Formation and Development of Green Parties" in The Green Challenge: The
Development a/Green Parties in Europe, Richardson and Rootcs cds., New York: Routledge,
1996,238.
123 Parkin, Green Politics, 218.219.
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In the general election of 1979, the British Greens ran under the label, the Ecology Party.
Prior to the election, the party decided to contest at least 50 sealS in the next general election so
that they could qualify for funds for campaign advertising on national television. They did
qualify for the all important funding by fielding 53 candidates, capturing 1.6 percent of the vote.
Although Ecology's perfonnance was to signal a series of poor elcctoral showings in national
elections, the 1979 election was significant because the party's campaign ads helped make them
a little better known in Great Britain. IZ'J
Like many other Green parties in the Ee, the 1979 EP election gave the Ecology Party the
opportunity 10 call attention to their concerns and run a campaign designed to educate the public
about the severity of environmental problems that were beginning to plague Great Britain.
However, the party organizers did a poor job of recruiting candidates to run under the Ecology
Party banner. In the three seats that they did contest, the party polled an average of3.7 percent
and did not win any seats. 1JO
In the 1983 national election, the British Greens faced stiff competition for voters that did
not want to support either the Labour Party or the Conservatives, Great Britain's two principal
political parties. lbis competition came in the form of an alliance between the SDP and Liberals,
which cut into potential support for the Ecology Party. The perception of a more viable
alternative to Great Britain's established parties, coupled with the popularity of the Thatcher
government in the wake of the Falklands conflict, once again scrved 10 make it difficult for the
m Wolfgang Rudig and Philip D. Lowe, "The Withered Greening of British Politics: A Study of
the Ecology Party", Polilical Studies, vo1.34, 268.
1)(1 David Butler and David Marquand, Europeon Elections and Brilish Politics, London:
Longman, 1981, 176.
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Ecology Party to make much oran impression on the electorate. III The 106 candidates that stood
for election under the Ecology Party banner were only successful in winning 1.0 percent of the
vote in these districts. The party also had the dubious distinction of losing more campaign
deposits than any other party.IJl
In the second European Parliamentary elections, the Greens hoped to improve upon their
previous perfonnance in the 1979 EP election. To do this, the party was successful in attracting
more candidates. However, the party continued to be beset by internal problems. For example,
there were many within the environmental movement that continued 10 question the viability of
electoral politics. Despite the aspirations thai the party could make inroads, they once again
failed to leave an impression on the results of the election. In the 16 districts in which the
Ecology Party presented candidates, the party could still only muster 2.7 percent of the vote in
theseconstiluencies. 1lJ
In 1985, the Greens once again changed their name, this time to the British Green Party.
However, a change in party label did little to help further their cause. In the British general
election of 1987, the party put up 133 candidates for election, but could only muster 1.3 percent
of thc votc and once again failed to win parliamentary representation. Il~
Until 1989, the British Greens could only secure a derisory percentage of the vote in
III Paul Byrne, "Great Britain: The Green Party" in New Politics in Western Europe: The Rise
and Success a/Green Parties and Alternative Lists, Ferdinand Muller-Rommel, cd., London:
Westview Press, 1989, 102.
13l Rudig and Lowe. "The WithereO Greening of British Politics", 267.
lJJ Ibid., 267.
1J.< Byrne, "Great Britain: The Green Party", 104.
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either national or European elections. Their only consolation was that they consistently fared
belter than parties that represented the extreme left and right. 1JS However, the 1989 European
election was, and continues 10 serve, as the most impressive perfonnance for the British Greens
in either a national or European election. In this election, the British Greens polled a surprising
14.9 percent of the vote and it marked the first time that they were able to field a fuB slate of
candidates.1M> Their share ofthe vote was also the largest that any Green party has ever captured
in Europe. From an elcctoral standpoint, the election instantly transfonncd one of the weakest
Green parties in Europe, into one of the strongest. As well, they temporarily replaced the Social
and Liberal Democrats as the principal third party. However, despite a performance that would
have proven beneficial to virtuallyevcry other Green party in Europe, it was still not enough for
the party to win a seat in the European Parliament. The surprise performance of the Greens in
the 1989 European election sent a message to the Conservative and Labour parties. Shortly after
this election, both parties attemptcd to promote and expand on their respective policies on the
environment and include these ideas in future campaign platforms. m
The euphoria of the 1989 EP election, ooupled with greater environmental awareness, led
many ecologists to believe that electoral success was possible. However, throughout most of the
19905, the party oontinued to wallow near the bottom of the electoral standings. In 1992, the
national election was a bitter disappointment after the optimism that the 1989 EP election had
13$ R. Taylor, "Green Parties and the Peace Movement" in A Socialist Anatomy ofBritain, D.
Coates, G. Johnston and R. Bush cds., Cambridge: Polity, 1985, 162.
):lli Andrew Adonis, "Great Britain", Electoral Studies, vol.8, no.3, 1989,266.
m Tom Burke, ''The Year of the Greens: Britain's Cultural Revolution", Environment, vol.3!,
no.9, 1989,20.
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provided. Given the nature of the British electoral system, the election left the British Green
Party with yet another dismal perfonnance at the polls. Although the party was successful in
fielding a record 256 candidates, they once again could only capture 1.3 percent of the vote. llI
Despite the collapse ofmos! of its membership and support after the 1992 national election, the
Greens once again pul up a full slate of candidates in the 1994 European election. However, the
election was yet another crushing blow for the party's fortunes. The Greens were also nol helped
when a leading cnviroruncntalist supported a Plaid Cymru candidate over a Green Party
candidate in Wales. While the party had hoped to build on, or at least maintain their vote, they
could only gamer 3.4 percent. 1J9 In the 1997 national election, the Greens adopted a strategy
based on the realityoftheir political situation and adopted an approach in which only a few
select districts were contested by the party. In the 84 seats where they did present candidates, the
party turned in one of their worst evcr perfornlanccs by only winning a minuscule 0.2 percent of
thevote.I<IO
The most successful moment in the history of the Greens came in the 1999 European
election, when for the first time, they won two seats in the European Parliament. A critical factor
in the success of the party in 1999 can largely be attributed 10 the fact that proportional
representation was used for the first lime in Great Britain. The introduction of PR had long been
advocated by the Greens and when it was introduced, they advertised the fact that a vote for the
IJg Chris Rootes, "Britain: Greens in a Cold Climate" in The Green Challenge: The Developmelll
ofGreen Parties in Europe, Richardson and Rootes eds., New York: Routledge, 1996,238.
139 Roger Mortimore, "Great Britain" Electoral Studies, vo!.13, no.4, 1994, 343.
1<10 O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 312.
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party was now much more important.1.] By winning 6.3 percent of the vote and capturing two
sealS, the Greens had at long last, entered the inner sanctum of British electoral politics.
In 2001, the Greens had its best showing ever in a national election. In the 145 seats
where the party presented candidates, the party won 2.9 percent of the vote. While they did not
win any seals, by winning considerable percentages of the vote in 10 constituencies. the Greens
for the first time were able to save some of their election dcposits.1 41
Overall, the poor perfonnance of the British Green Party, whether in national or European
elections, has deeper roots. Unlike many Olher Green parties throughout western Europe, the
British Greens did not emerge from a widespread grassroots base of protest movements even
though Great Britain has the largest environmental movement in Europe. Ever since their
inception in 1973, they have lried to persuade members of the environmental movement to
recognize them as their political representatives. However, there has been little success in this
regard and they have drawn little electoral support from these movements. 14l Despite over 20
years of campaigning at the national level that has harvested few successes and a series of
setbacks, the Greens appear ready to continue contesting national elections. However, it appears
that the only realistic means of continuing to remain in the British political arena will be at the
,., British Green Party, 1999 European Election Website, http:www.greenparty.org.uk,Accessed
on July 1, 2001
141 British Green Party, 2001 General Election Website, http:www.votegreen.org.uk,Accessedon
July 1,2001.
14l Ferdinand Muller-Rommel and Thomas Poguntke, "The Unharmonious Family: Green Parties
in Western Europe" in The Greens in West Germany: Organization and Policy Making, Eva
Kolinsky, ed., Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989, 18.
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European level, especially since the introduction of PR makes it easier for smaller parties like the
Greens to win seals.
6:2 The Electoral System in Great Britain
Although the British Green Party contest elections al all levels of government, they have
enjoyed little electoral success. Moreover, while Green candidates from countries throughout
western Europe have been elected to sil in their respective national parliaments, the British
Greens have to date, been shut out of representation al Westminster. Even in the 1989 European
election when they captured nearly 15 percent of the vote, they still failed to win a seat in the
European Parliament.
The primary reason for this poor showing can largely be attributed to Great Britain's first-
past-the-pOSI electoral system. Under this system, Great Britain is divided into hundreds of
smaller constituencies. For example. in the most recent national election in June of2001, Great
Britain was comprised of 659 such districts. The voting process and the allocation oftransfcrring
seats into votes is a relatively straightforward procedure. Voters in eaeh constituency are given
the opportunity to place a vote for the candidate oftbeir choice. The fact that the British voter
has only one choice means that the FPTP ballot structure is categorical and not ordinal in its
composition. To win a seat under this system. a candidate does not require a majority of the
votes cast. Instead, each seat is awarded to the candidate that has garnered the most votes. As
illustrated below in Figure 6.1, the Labour candidate wins the seat, even though the candidate did
not obtain a majorityoflhe votes that were cast.
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Fi~ure 6.1- SamDle of the First Past the Post S stem in Great Britain
Party of Candidate
Lobo.,
Conservative
Liberal Democrat
Green
Total
NQ/'" Hypothetical liguresdcvisedbyaulhor.
Votes
7,500
5,000
3,500
1,000
N= 17,000
Percentage
44.1
29.4
20.6
5.9
100.0
In repealing this process throughout Great Britain. the party that goes on to win the
majority ofthese contests is normally asked to form the government. Due to the single member
plurality system, the governing party usually wins the majority of the seals and governs alone. l44
However, a consequence of this system is that it does nOI allocate seats proportional to the
percentage of votes cast for each party. As such, Great Britain's larger parties have benefited
greatly from this system at the expense of smaller parties.
While the FPTP system has proven to be discouraging to smaller parties, the electoral
rules involved in electing members to sit in the European Parliament are now much more
advantageous. This is especially true since the 1999 EP elections. With the introduction of the
European Parliamentary Act 1999, the allocation of transferring votes into seats changed from
the FPTP system to one based on proportional representation. The change to PR had long been
advocated by the British Green party because they were cognizant of the fact that they had a
better chance to win seats under this system. I., For example, ifPR had been used in the 1989 EP
election, the party would havc won twelve seats, provided that their vote sh.are of 14.9% was not
1« Keating, The Politics ofModern Europe, 77.
I~l Byrne: "Great Britain: The Green Party", 109.
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affected by the electoral system change.
In June of 1999, voters in Great Britain took part in the first EP election 10 be contested
under PRo In this new systcrn, Great Britain was divided imo eleven different regions comprising
84 seats. The number of seats in each region is proportional to the population oftha! region and
this ranged from four to eleven seats. I-!/; Seals were then subsequently allocated according to the
d'Hondt method of proportional representation. This system was selected because it comes close
to ensuring that in each region, parties will win a share of the seats that is essentially proportional
to their share of the vote in that region. 141
Besides the imroduction of PR, there are a number of advumages in EP elections that
were present before the 1999 EP election. One obvious advantage that existed even before 1999
was the fact that there are fewer seats to contest in EP elections than in national elections. With
fewer seats to contest, it is easier for the Greens to field a full slate ofcandidates. As Table 6.1
indicates, it has been much easier for the party to accomplish this feat in European elections.
1-16 Colin Railings and Michael Thrasher, "Assessing the Significance of the Elections of 1999"
Talking Politics, vol.l2, no.2, 301.
141 David Butler and Martin Westlake, British Politics and European Elections: 1999, New York:
St. Martin's Press, 2000, 32-35.
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Table 6.1- Green Party Candidates in National and European Elections as a Percentage of
Contested Seals, 1979-2001
No. of National Percentage of No. of European Percentage of
Candidates Contested Seats Candidates CootestedSeats
1979 53 8.4 1979 3 3.9
1983 106 16.3 1984 16 20.5
1987 133 20.5 1989 78 100.0
1992 256 39.4 1994 84 100.0
1997 84 12.7 1999 84 100.0
2001 145 20.0
SoWct: Table e.....struClcd from Wolfgang Rudig and Philip D. Lowe. "The Withered Guming of British Politics: A Study of the
&ology Party", Po/iJieal Sludil'S, "01.34, 261.265; John Burchell, "Here Comes the Greens Again: The Green pany in BriTain"
£,m'ron~nl(J1 P<J!it"'s, vol.9, 00.3, 145; and Brjtish Creen Pany, 2001 Cenens! Election, htlp:www.volegreen,org.uk
In national elections, the Greens would need 659 candidates in order to have a full slate of
candidates. As table 6.1 demonstrates, this is an accomplishment that the Greens have never
come close to fulfilling. Ifmost constituencies do not have Green candidates, then most voters
cannot votc for the Greens simply because no candidate is present in their district. However, as
Table 6.1 also illustrates, organizatiollll1 problems of this nature are much easier to handle in EP
elections. In the 1989, 1994, and 1999 elections, all voters in Great Britain were at least given
the opportunity to vote for the Greens, leaving the party a better chance to win a larger share of
the vote in these elections.
With the introduction of PR, further advantages can also be cited that makes it easier for
the Greens to win a larger share of the vote in EP elections. For example, Green Party voters no
longer have to be as geographically concentrated as under the plurality system. When a smaller
party's support is geographically concentrated, it is more likely to win seats than a party that has
its support dispersed throughout the country. The Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru are
two such parties that have been able to win seats because of the geographic concentration of their
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electoral support.l~a For example, in the 1994 EP election, both the SNP and the Greens won 3.2
percent of the vote. However, the $NP won two seats while the Greens failed 10 elect any
candidates.
A further benefit of the PR system is Ihal it also frees the electorate from having to vote
strategically. Under the plurality system, a vote for the British Green party has consistently
proven to have been a wasted vote. As a result of this, many votcrs while wanting to vole for the
Greens, will revert 10 voting strategically and cast a ballot for a party that they perceive to have a
better cbance of winning the seat. PR on the other hand, encourages a multi-party system where
fewer votcs are wasted, leaving the Greens with a better chance at winning seats and thus. a
larger share of the vote.
6:3 Vote Switching and Electoral Cycles in British European Elections
During the course of the past 22 years, the British Greens have contested six national
elections and five European elections. Table 6.2 summarizes the perfonnance of the British
Greens in elections during the years 1979·2001. An analysis of the vote percentage in national
and European elections indicates that they have consistently received a significantly greater share
of the vote in European elections.
148 Jorgen Rasmussen, "They Also Serve: Small Parties in the British Political System" in Small
Parties i" Western Europe, F. Muller-Rommel ed., London: Sage Publieations, 1991, 171.
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Table 6.2- Green Party Vote Percentaee in National aod I<:uropean E'«tions' 1979·2001
British National Elections European Eledions
1979
1983
1987
1992
1997
2001
1.6...
1,0.,
1.4
1.3
0.2
2.9
1979
1984
1989
1994
1999
3.7.,
2.7..
14.9
3.2
6.3
Source. Table constructed from l'm1inand Muller·Rommel, "E~lllaining the Electoral Success ofGrem Panics" 154, Neil caler,
'"The Green in the 1999 European Parli""",ntary Election.5~, 161 and Un;vcBity ofDusseldorf, PartiestJnd Elutions in Europe,
hl1p:www.-public.rz..uni-duess<!orfdcl-nordswicwliodcx.html
a-Contcstedcleclion as the EcologyPany
Similar to other European countries, European elections in Great Britain have occurred
during different limes in the national election cycle. In 1979 and 1984, they occurred in the early
stages, while the 1989, 1994, and 1999 EP elections occurred midway through the mandates of
the Thatcher, Major and Blair governments. Tables 6.3 10 6.7 shows the percentage of the vote
cast for British parties that have contested national and European elections betwecn 1979 and
1999. Each table indicates the gains and losses in EP elections as compared to the preceding
national election and each party is listed in rank order in accordance with these gains and losses.
1979
The first directly elected vote campaign for the European Parliament was held just one
month after Margaret Thatcher's ConselValive party fonned a majority government in May of
1979. During such a short period of time, the British electorate would nol have had much lime to
have grown disillusioned with the government.
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Table 6.3- Performance of British Parties in tbe 1979 European EI«tion Compared to the
1979 National Election Gains and Losses in %)
Party 1979 EE 1979NE Gains or Losses
Conservative.. 48.4 43.9 +4.5
Ecology Party 3.7 1.6 +2.1
SDLP 1.0 0.4 +0.6
SNP 1.9 1.6 +0.3
Plaid Cymru 0.6 0.4 +0.2
Liberal 12.6 13.8 -1.2
LaboUf-b 31.6 36.9 -5.3
Others 0.2 1.4
So",~.KarlhelnzRelf,TcnEuropeanElecllon •. 205
As Table 6.3 indicates, a number of interesting findings become apparent. First of all, the
Conservatives were the obvious benefactors of a post-election euphoria. This was because they
had only been in power for one month and they actually won a larger share ofthe vote in the
European election than they had in the national contest. On the olher hand, Great Britain'5
principal opposition parties, the Liberals and Labour, witnessed drops in support. Amongst
smaller parties listed, the SDLP, SNP and the Ecology Party also made gains. In particular, the
largest gains went 10 the Greens, as they jumped from 1.6 percent of the vote in the national
election, to 3.7 percent of the vote in the European election.
1984
The 1984 European election occurred one year after Margaret Thatcher's Conservative
party formed their second majority government in June of 1983. Due to the fact that the 1984 EP
election was held only one year after the last general election, the British electorate would still
have had little time to have grown disil1usioned with the ruling Conservatives.
91
Table 6.4- Performance of British Parties in the 1984 European Election Compared to the
1983 National Election Gains and Losses in %)
Party 1984 EE 1983 NE Gains or Losses
Labour-ll 36.6 28.3 +8.3
Ecology Party 2.7 1.0 +1.7
SNP 1.7 1.1 +0.6
PlaidCymru 0.8 0.4 +0.4
Conservatives 40.8 43.5 -2.7
Lib/SOP 13.0 19.5 -6.5
Others 4.4 6.2
SoUr«' Hugh Bo:mnglon, "Th~ Bnbsh Gcncrlll mCC!lon of 1983", Eltctoral S,udles, vol.2, no.3, 1983,266, Paul Jew'll, Great
Br;lain~ElocloroISludjc,voU,no.J.19&4,284
While Ihe results afthe 1984 EP election are consistent with the second-order election
model, the British electorate was still not as critical orthe Conservatives as they would prove to
be in latter EP elections. The Conservatives only lost 2.7 percent of the support from the 1983
national election, while the overwhelming benefactor was the Labour Party. Amongst Great
Britain's smaller parties, the SNP, Plaid Cmyru and Ecology Party all made gains. With a gain
of 1.7 percent, the Greens were second only to the Labour Party in this capacity and made the
largest gains of any small party for the second consecutive EP election.
1989
The 1989 European election occurred two ycars after the last national election, making it
the first to be conducted at any distance from the preccding national election. As a mid-teon
evaluation, the governing Conservatives would be subjected to much harsher criticism than they
had in 1979 or in 1984.
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Table 6.5- Performance of British Parties in the 1989 European Election Compared to the
1987 National EI~tion Gains and Losses in %
p,ny 1989EE 1987NE Gains or Losses
British Green Party 14.9 I., +13.5
Labour-b 40.1 31.5 +8.6
SNP 2.6 1.3 +1.3
PlaidCymru 0.8 1.2 -0.4
LiberaJ Democrats 6.6 8.6 -2.0
Conservatives... 34.7 42.3 -7.6
Others 0.3 13.7
:)QWN:t:. Table constructed from TomMacklc, Europe f'oIe.J J, 322, Oskar N'cdcrma)1'r, European El«llons 1989" EurofHon
JourtllJlo!PoIi/;calllfilll1,d,voI.19.no.I,IS5.
According to Table 6.5, it is evident thai the Conservatives lost more support than they
had in 1984. However, what stands out themos! is the gains earned by the Greens. By far, the
party was the overwhelming benefactor of disillusionment. In this election, the Greens gained
14.9 percent, an increase of 13.5 percent and was Ihe largest gain made by any Green party to
date. For the third consecutive EP election, the Greens also had the largest gains of any other
smaller party.
1994
Similar to the 1989 EP election, the 1994 contest was also a mid-tenn evaluation as the
last national election had been held in 1992. At this time the Conservatives continued to remain
in power, however, they were now led by a new leader, John Major.
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Table 6.6- Performance of British Parties in the 1994 European Election Compared to the
1992 National Election Gains and Losses in %
Porty 1979 EE 1979NE Gains or Losses
Labour.t. 44.2 34.4 +9.8
British Green Party 3.2 1.1 +2.3
SNP 3.2 1.9 +1.3
Plaid Cymru 1.1 0.5 +{).6
Liberal Democrats 16.7 17.9 -1.2
Conservatives.. 27.9 41.9 -14.0
Others 0.7 2.3
SOur~e. Table construCted from EleclQral SlI/il,es, >"(11.1 I, no.4, 1992, Roger Mornmore, Greal Bnlilln EleclOrol SJud~$,
voI.IJ,no.4,l994,342
a-{iovemingparty. b-Principalopposilionpany.
As Table 6.6 indicates, the electorate was once again very critical of the Conservative
government. Moreover, the drop in support for the Conservatives under Major, at 14 percent was
much larger than it had been in previous EP elections. Despite falling short in comparison 10 the
gains that were made in 1989, the Greens were second only to Labour. As well. for the fourth
consecutive EP election the Greens made the largest gains of all smaller parties.
1999
The 1999 European election promised to be a break-through campaign for the British
Greens. As mentioned earlier. the introduction ofPR made it likely that the Greens would
capture a larger share of the vote in European elections. As well, the 1999 EP election was also a
mid-tenn election as the last national election had been held in May of 1997 and the next did not
take place until June of2001. Combined. these two factors would allow the Greens the
opportunity to make consider.able gains from their perfonnance in the last national election.
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Table 6.7- Performance of British Parties in the 1999 European Election Compared to the
1997 National Election Gains and Losses in %)
Party 1999EE 1997NE Gains or Losses
UKIP 7.0 0.3 +6.7
British Green Party 6.3 0.2 +6,1
ConservativeS-!. 35.8 30.7 +5.1
PlaidCyrnru 1.9 0.5 +1.4
SNP 2.8 2.0 +<J.8
BNP 1.0 1.4 +0.4
SDLP 1.0 0.6 +0.4
Liberal Democrat 12.2 16.7 -4.5
Labour.. 28.0 43.2 -15.2
Others 4.0 4.4
Sollrct. UOIvmmy nfOusseldorf, Parllts anti E/ec/lOns In Europe, hl1p,WWW. pubhc.JZ.uOI-<lucssdorf,dcInordsVlcwlllldex.hlml
a-Govemingparty.J>.Principaloppositionparly
As Table 6.7 illustrates, the governing Labour Party was given a strong reprimand from
the electorate as they dropped over 15 percent from the 1992 national election. This drop in
support meant that a considemble number of Labour voters looked to other parties, including the
British Green Party. For the fifth consecutive EP election, the Greens received a larger share of
the vote than they had in the previous national election. However, unlike in past EP elections,
the Greens did not make the largest gains amongst smaller parties. lnstead, this distinction went
to the UKIP, a party that was vehemently opposed to the European Union and further integration.
Regardless, their share of the vote still increased significantly, as they jumped from 0.2 percent
of the vote in the 1997 national election, to 6.3 percent.
As Tables 6.3 to 6.7 indicate, the perfonnance of the British Green Party fits in
accordance with the second-order election model because they have consistently received a larger
share oflhe vote in European elections. While these gains have come regardless of when EP
eleclions have transpired in the national election cycle, it is worth noting that the size of these
9S
gains have depended largely on when the EP election fell into the cycle. In the two elections that
took place in the early siages orlhe cycle, in 1979 and 1984, the Greens made gains of2.1 and
1.7 percent respectively, for an average gain of 1.9 percent. In 1989, 1994, and 1999, three
elections held during mid-tenn, the Greens made gains of 13.5, 2.3, and 6.1 percent, for an
average increase of 7.3 percent. According to the election cycle hypothesis, voting for smaller
parties is supposed 10 be more pronounced during this stage. The difference in the average gain
made by the Greens during the two stages orlhe election cycle, at 5.4 percent, indicates that
voting for the Greens has been more evident during the late stages and coincides with the
election cycle model.
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Chapter 7
Luxembourg: Dei Greng
7.1 An Electoral History of the Luxembourg Green Party
Despite a population that numbers in the thousands rather than the millions, Luxembourg
can also boast ofa strong ecological movement. While the origins of the ecologists movement
dates back to the early 1970s, it was not until 1979 that ecologists in Luxembourg first came
together to participate in electoral politics. The origins of the Luxembourg Green Party can be
traced 10 the concurrent national and European elections of 1979, when dissident members of
Luxembourg's Socialist and Communist parties formed a new party known as the Alternative
Lescht-Wiert tech (AGWL).149
The AIrWL was not a political party based on traditional lines. but rather a temporary
electoral arrangement set up to conlest the 1979 elections. The primary purpose of AL-WL was
to use both campaigns as an opportunity to express their opposition to the construction of a
nuclear power station in Luxembourg. lso Despite optimistic predictions that the party could
mobilize voters that opposed Luxembourg's nuclear energy program, support for the party failed
to materialize. This failure came about for two primary reasons. First, like most new parties,
AL-AL had trouble breaking into Luxembourg's political arena. Second, the LSAP, a major
socialist party, had also adopted an anti-nuclear stand and this only served to take away many
potential supporters. After polling a meagre \.0 percell! in both elections, the AL-WL disbanded
14'1 Parkin, Green Parties, 169-170.
1$0 Wolfgang Rudig, ''The Greens in Europe: Ecological Parties and the European
Elections of 1984", Parliamellwry Affairs, 1985, vo1.38, no.l, 61.
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immediately after the campaigns.Ul
For some ecologists, the poor results in the 1979 elections reinforced the notion thai
abandoning the traditional means of movement politics for electoral politics was not a viable
option. However, it was also obvious to many that a pennanent political party would be more
effective than merely establishing temporary political parties,l)l In 1983, an agreement was
reached by a plethora of environmental groups, fonner members of AL-WL, and members of the
feminist, peace and anti-nuclear groups to Conn a pennanent Green party. Inspired by the success
of the Gennan and Belgian Greens, Dei Grcng Alternative (The Green Alternative) was founded
on June 23, 1983. lSJ
The first foray by the Green Alternative into electoral politics was met with mixed results.
Although the party polled a more impressive 6.2 percent of the vote in the 1984 EP election, they
did not win any seats.l~ Although the Greens failed to win any representation in this election,
the national election proved to be more profitable. In this election, while the party polled less
than they had in the European election, their 5.2 percent of the vote was enough to capture two
scats in the Chamber of Deputlcs. IS$
By 1989, the Green Alternative had hoped to make further inroads at both the national
lSI Mario Hirsch, "Luxembourg", Ten European Elections, 144.
Il2 Thomas Koeble, "Luxembourg: The Green Alternative" in New Politics in Western
Europe: The Rise and Success o/Green parties and Alternative Lists, Ferdinand Muller.
Rommel, cd., London: Westview Press, 1989, 131.
III O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 132.
I~ Rudig, "The Greens in Europe", 61.
us O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 132.
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and European levels. However, a serious split amongst different faclions of the party severely
hurt their electoral chances in both elections. A splinter group from within the party, broke away
and presented their own list under the banner Greng Lescht Ekologesch Initiative (Green List for
Ecological Initiative). GLEI was founded by Jup Weber, who had been elected to Luxembourg's
Chamber of Deputies as a member of the Green Alternative in 1984, but broke ranks with the
party over ideological dilTerences.l~ Combined, the two parties garnered 8.9 percent in the
national election and each party won two seats. However, the two parties would have been better
served iflhey had presented a united list of candidates. This was especiaJly evident in the EP
contest, as GLEI won 6.1 percent and the Green Alternative captured 4.3 percent. U7
Unfortunately for supporters of Luxembourg's green movement, no Green MEP's were elected.
However, a unified Green party would have won over 10 percent of the vote and this would have
almost certainly guaranteed at least one of Luxembourg's six seats.
Realizing that these divisions were seriously hurting both parties' electoral chances, GLEI
and the Green Altemalive seuled their political differences. In reaching a consensus on party
policy, the two groups presented a united list in time for the 1994 elections. This time around,
the fortunes of the Green movement were greatly improved. In the European contest, the Greens
won 10.9 percent ofthe vote and seized a seat from Luxembourg's largest party, the CSV. In the
national election, the Greens polled 10.1 percent and captured five seats. l "
156 O'Neill, Green Parties and Political Change in Contemporary Europe, 132.
1~1Mackie,Europe Votes 3, 199.
11$ Michael Smart, "Luxembourg; European and National Elections of 1994", West
European Politics, vol.18, no. I , 1995, 194.
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In the 1999 elections, the Greens lost some of the support they had garnered in the 1994
contests. In the national election, the Greens only won 8.5 percent, but were still able to hold on
to their five seats in the Chamber of Deputies. The Greens also lost support in the EP election,
polling 10.7 percent, but still retained their one seat in the European Parliamenl. lS9
7.2 The Electoral System of Luxembourg
A feature unique to Luxembourg is that EP and national elections are held at the same
time. This was nol a deliberate arrangement, rather, it carne about after the United Kingdom
failed to ratify legislation that would have enabled EP elections to have been held in May/June
1978. The new date selected for the firs! EP elcctions, June of 1979, happened 10 ooincide with
the national election. Due to the fact that both Parliaments are on a fixed, five year cycle,
elections have been held concurrently ever since. Curremly, there is little demand to change the
simultaneous holding of the two types of elections. The only means of doing so would require a
premature dissolution of the national legislature, or an amendment to the constitution and this
would prove arduoUS. I60
Similar to Belgium, Luxembourg uses proportional representation for both types of
elections. Luxembourg's method ofPR in national elections, known as Hagenbach-Bischoff
system, is a combination of voting for candidates and party lists. In national elections, in order to
elect the 60 members thaI sit in the Chamber of Deputies, Luxembourg is divided into four multi-
member districts that arc in tum, comprised of a number of seats proportional to each district's
,,~ Carter, "The Greens in the 1999 European Parliamentary Elections", 161.
160 Derek Hearl, "Luxembourg" Electoral Studies, vol. 13. no.4, 1994, 349-350, 357.
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share of the electorate,161 For example, the national legislature is composed of nine seats in the
North, 21 in the Center, seven in the East and 23 in the Southern district. In each of these
districts. parties have the option 10 present lists with as many candidates as there are seats to be
contested in thai district. For example, ira district has 23 seats, then each party can place up to
23 names on its list. 162
In national elections. when it comes 10 casting ballots, voters have the option of lodging
as many votes as there arc seats to be filled. Also in national cleclions, panachage is permitted.
Panachage is a procedure that permits voters to distribute their votes over different candidates
and even have the option to cast more than one vole for a single candidate. Alternatively, voters
may cast a vote for the party list and this is the same as giving one preference vote to each
candidate that appears on the party's list ofcandidates. These votes, also known as list votes,
help to detennine the total number of scats that a party wins, but are irrelevant in detennining
which of its candidates are elected. This is due to the fact that the election of candidates is
detenninod by the difference in the number of votes cast for each candidate. In contrast 10
Belgium, parties in Luxembourg are powerless in detennining which of their candidates are
elected. l6J
In EP elections, PR is also used, but on a national and not a district basis. Luxembourg
161 Gordon L. Wei!, The Benelllx COllntries: The Politics ofSmall Coullfry Democracies,
New York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1970,205.
161 Cees van der Eijk and Hermann Schmitt, "Luxembourg: Second-order Irrelevance" in
Choosing Europe?: The Ellropean Electorate and National Politics in the Face ofUnion, Cees
van der Eijk and Mark Franklin, ods. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996, 202.
16l van der Eijk and Schmitt, "Luxembourg", 202.
101
consists of a single constituency and seats are in turn, allocated by the d'Hondt method. Unlike
in national contest, parties are permitted to include more candidates (to a maximum of 12) than
there arc scats to be filled (six). This provision is necessary because many candidates that appear
on party lists in EP elections are also on the ballot for national elections. In tum, many
candidates that arc elected 10 sil as MEP's resign in order to sit in the nationallegislature,'64
As in the case of national elections, panachage is pennitted, but voters must distribute
their votes over different candidates, or cast a vole for the list as a whole. Unlike national
elections however, votcrs are not pcnnitled to cast morc than onc vote for a single candidate.
This leads to voters having to disperse their votes amongst the various party lists and the
candidates on those lists. To summarize, a voter may cast a ballot for the entire list. vote for
candidates from more than one list, or choose individual candidates from a particular list. Seats
are then allocated on the basis of the number of votes obtained by the different candidates and
partylistS. 16S
While the electoral system used in European elections resembles the method employed in
national elections, some differences exist that make EP elections more favourable to smaller
parties. For example, one nationwide constituency instead of four can be considered as an
advantage. To elaborate, smaller parties would require fewer nationally. or at least regionally,
renowned candidates to act as their spitzenkandidat. The spitzenkandidat heads the list of each
party in an effort 10 attract as many voters as possible. If a smaller party has a popular individual
to act as their spitzenkandidat, the party can take advantage of this individual to draw support for
164 Hearl. "Luxembourg", 351.
161 van der Eijk and Schmitt, "Luxembourg", 202-203.
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the party throughout the country and not just in one district. For example, the Green's
spitzenlwndidat for the 1994 EP elections was headed by Jup Weber, a seasoned politician of
national prominence. l66 However, in national elections, candidates like Weber could be utilized
by the Greens as their spitzenkandidat in only onc oCthe four districls.
While these advantages have made European elections more easier to contest, there are
also some disadvantages that could possibly prevent them from winning a larger share of the vote
in these contests. One such obstacle involves surpassing the threshold that is necessary in order
to win representation in national and European elections. In both types ofelections, the larger
the number of scats available,the lower the percentage of the vote a party requires in order to
surpass the threshold and win representation. Due 10 the fact that there are 60 seats available in
national elections and only six in European contests, a lower threshold is needed in national
elections in order to win seats. For example in the 1984 EP election, despite winning 6.2 percent
of the vote, the Greens did not win any seats. However, their 5.2 percent of the vote in the
concurrent national election was good enough for the party to win two seats on the Chamber of
Deputies. lfit is harder for a small party to win seats in European elections because of the higher
threshold, it would be plausible to think that the wasted vote argument would be more prevalent
in these elections. However, as will be demonstrated in section 7.3, this has not prevented the
Greens from winning larger shares of the vote in European contests.
7.3 Vote Switching in European ~nd National Elections in Luxembourg
While national and European elections are held concurrently, voters in Luxembourg are
'1J61bid,207.
103
no different from voters in any olher EU country in that a segment of the electorate choose to
vote for one party in a national election, and a different party in a European election. As such. it
is not surprising that in European elections, larger and governing parties would lose support,
while smaJler parties receive a larger share of the vote than they are accorded in national
elections. However, the concept of smaller parties winning support at the expense of governing
parties is nol as relevant in Luxembourg. Expressing disillusionment with governing parties in
European elections, while voting for them in national elections, makes little sense.
What differences could be expected in the perfonnance of the Greens in a country that
hold simultaneous elections? One would expect there would be little, or marginal differences at
best. While the results for the Greens in the two types of elections have varied to an extent, the
differences are more marginal in comparison to the perfonnances of other Green parties included
in this study. Table 7.1 gives an overview of me electoral perfonnance of the Greens during the
years 1979-1999. As Table 7.1 indicates, with the exception of 1979, the Greens have
consistently received a greater share of the vote in European elections than in national elections.
Table 7.1~ Green Party Vote Percentai!e in National and European Elections' 1979·1999
National Elections European Elections
1979 1.0., 1979 1.0
1984 5.2 1984 6.2
1989 8.94> 1989 10.44>
1994 9.9.., 1994 10.9..,
1999 9.1.., 1999 10.7..,
Source. "Explaining the EleclonI[ Success ofGrccn Panic., A Cross National Anal)'$i5~. E"v;r'(m"",,,/,,I P,,/ilics, "01.7, no.4.
1998, l54 ood Neil Carter, ''The Greens in the 1999 EUTOpI!O" Parliamelftary flee/iOltS" f"",ronmelftal Politics, YoI.S, 00.4,
1999,161
a- AL-WI.. b-Aggregaloo lotal. c-OI..EIIOAP joimlisl
Although the election cycle model is not applicable in the case of Luxembourg, there is
still somc difference in the share ofthe vote parties receive in national and European elections.
104
Tables 7.2 to 7.6 below shows the percentage of the vole cast for Luxembourg parties that have
contested national and European elections between 1979 and 1999. Each table also indicates the
gains and losses in EP elections compared to the preceding national election. Finally, each party
is listed in rank order in accordance with these gains and losses.
1979
Leading up to the first directly elected European parliament, Luxembourg had been ruled
by a center-left C()alition comprised of the OP and the POSL. However, in the national election
this coalition was defeated by Luxembourg's other major party, the Christian Socialists. In the
European election, a total of eight parties presented candidates.
Table 7.2- Performance of Luxembourg Parties in the 1979 European Ejection Compared
to the 1979 National Election Gains and Losses in %
Party 1979 EE 1979 NE Gains or Losses
DP. 28.2 21.3 +6.9
CSV.. 36.1 34.5 +1.6
P,D 7.0 6.0 +1.0
PL 0.6 0.2 +0.4
LCR 0.2 0.5 +0.3
AL-WL 1.0 1.0 0.0
PCL 5.0 5.8 -0.8
POSL-. 21.9 24.3 ·2.4
Others 6.2
Source. Karlhcmz Rc,f, Tm european Elections, 209
a·(}o\l.TIling particsbeforc the 1979 national election. PTincipaloppositionparry.
Amongst Luxembourg's three major parties, the DP and CS made gains while the POSt
experienced a drop in support. For the Greens, the AL-WL received the identical amount of
support in both elections. While the party did not lose support in the European election, they did
not make gains as would be expected according the second-order election model. This
occurrence was the only time that the Luxembourg Greens did not win a larger share of the vote
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in a European election.
1984
Table 7.3- Performance of Luxembourg Parties in tbe 1984 European Election Compared
to the 1984 National Election Gains and Losses in %
Party 1984 EE 1984NE Gains or Losscs
Greens 6.2 5.2 +1.0
OP. 21.1 2004 +fJ.7
Ind. Socialists 2.6 2.0 +fJ.6
PCL 4.1 4.4 -0.3
CSV.. 35.3 36.6 -1.3
POSL.t. 30.3 31.8 -1.5
Others 0.5 0.7
Souru,MLuxetrbourg",ElectoraIS'udies,vol.3,no.3,1984,300.
The difference in the perfonnances of Luxembourg's parties in the 1984 national and
European elections was marginal. The Greens were only one ofthrcc parties to make gains in the
European contest as they jumped from 5.2 percent of the vote in the national election to 6,2 in the
European election. This gain of 1.0 percent was the largest made by any party that contested
both elections.
1989
Table 7.4- Performance of Luxembourg Parties in tbe 1989 European Eledion Compared
to tbe 1989 National Election Gains and Losses in 0/.
Party 1989 EE 1989NE Gains or Losses
Greens.., 10.4 7.4 +3.0
OP. 20.0 17.2 +2.8
CSv.• 34.9 32.4 +1.5
NB 2.9 2.\ +0.8
KPL 4.7 4.4 +fJ.3
LSAP-l> 25.4 26.2 -0.8
Othon; 1.7 10.5
Source. Derek Hearl, Luxembourg, Elecloral Slud,~... vol.8, no.3, 1989,301 302.
a- Govmling panics. b- Principal opposition party. C-~aled GLEIIGAP lotal.
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As Table 7.4 illustrates, the difference in the pcrfonnances of Luxembourg's parties was
once again marginal. However, this lime around the Greens made a larger gain than they had in
the 1984 contest. Combined, the Greens jumped from 7.4 percent in the national election, to
10.4 percent in the European election. This gain of 3.0 percent marked the second time that the
Greens had the distinction of making the largest gains of any party in Luxembourg.
1994
Table 7.S- Performance of Lunmbourg Parties in the 1994 European Election Compared
to tbe 1994 National Election Gains and Losses In %
Party 1994 EE 1994 NE Gains or Losses
DP. 18.9 14.5 +4.4
CSV.• 31.4 29.5 +1.9
Greens 10.9 10.1 +0.8
ADR 7.0 7.7 -0.7
KPL 1.6 2.4 -0.8
LSAP-b 24.8 30.4 -5.6
Oth= 5.4 5.4
Sow,..,. Table constructed from Dcn:k Hearl, uLuxembou~~. EleaoralSlUa,,,., vo1.13, no.4, 1994,355 andMlchacl Smart,
"luxembourg, European and National Elc<:lion.ofl994",EleclOnzIStudiN,vol.18.no.l, 19'95. 195
Amongst Luxembourg's three major parties, the DP and CSV made gains while the
LSAP wimessed losses. For the Greens, while they made gains for the third consecutive election,
it was marginal. Combined. the joint list of the Green Alternative and GLEI jumped from 10.1
percent in the national election to 10.9 percent.
'9"
In the 1999 European election, the governing CSV made gains while their coalition
partners, the Democratic Party, experienced a loss. In this election, the Greens had to deal with
competition from another ecologist party, the Green and Liberal Alliance, who took 1.1 percent
in the national election and 1.8 percent in the European election. Regardless, the combined
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Green Altemative/GLEllistjumped from 7.5 percent in the national election, to 10.7 in the
European contest. This gain of3.2 percent, was the largest gain made by any party, and marked
the third such occasion in which the Greens had achieved such a feat.
Table 7.6- Performance of Luxembourg Parties in the 1999 European EledloD Compared
to the 1999 National Election Gains and Losses in %
Party 1999 EE 1999 NE Gains or Losses
Gre"" 10.7 7.5 +3.2
CSV.. 31.9 30.4 +1.5
GAL 1.8 1.1 +fJ.7
LSAP 23.2 22.6 +fJ.•
ADR 20.5 22.0 -1.5
DP. 9.0 10.5 -1.5
Others
S<!~rce. Un,vcrs'lyofDusscldorf, Par',,:s and Elewo1l.J '" Ellro{X', http. ._pubhc.rz.un,-I_nordSVlewllndx.html, EPM
Magazine, u Magazined.. Parliament el de I'Dc/ualile Europunne, hnp,IIYMW.trm.Iw'''l'''''id62.htm
The results ofEuropcan elections in Luxembourg indicates that the second order election
model, although not as obvious as for other Green parties, is still applicable in the case of the
Greens. However, the outoomes of these elections could not, as in other countries included in
this study, be construed as any kind of evaluation of government perfonnance, or as an update of
a party's standing with the electorate. The fact that both national and European elections are held
concurrently prevents this. As such, there is simple no possibility for perceiving the results of
European elections in Luxembourg as an indicator of national trends, or as a sign of things to
come. Gains made by the Greens in EP elections is best explained by the fact that because there
is less at stake, voters are freed from ooncems about government fonnation and instead, lodge
expressive votes of support for the party in these oontests.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Summary of Findings
What has been discovered about discrepancies in Green party voting in national and
European elections? First, this study has come to the conclusion that with only a few exceptions,
the second-ordcr election model. as it applies to smaller parties, is in acoordance with the
performances of all Green partics included in this study. While the Greens have been the victims
of insincere voting in national elections, the converse has often held true in European elections.
This is because voters have used EP elections in one of two ways. First, many voters choose a
party that they would not vote for in a national election because they wish to voice their
displeasure with the party they normally support in a national election. Second, in European
elections, voting can also become more expressive and therefore, is consistent with the central
notion that less is at stake. In contrast to national elections, in which the electorate "votes with
the head", in a European election, voters are freed from concerns about government rormation
and will "vote with the heart".
Due to the fact that EP elections are considered to be second-order elections, voters have
demonstrated a greater tendency to vote for the Greens in these contests. The notion that EP
elections are second-order in nature offers the best explanation of why smaller parties, including
the Greens, generally do better in tpese contests. While it was not tested in this study, it would
be interesting to examine whether the effects of second order elections has an impact on the
electoral performance of the Grccns in each country.
\09
As well, the Greens have generally made larger gains than have other small parties.
However, on several occasions, small xenophobic, or anli-EU parties have surpassed the Greens
in terms of the size of the gains made in European contests. This leaves the study to suggest that
anti-establishment parties, including the Greens. do particularly well because the second-order
nature of EP elections gives voters a greater impetus 10 lodge a 'protest vote' against governing
parties.
Allhough it is unclear how electoral rules affect Green party voting, this study has come
to the conclusion that discrepancies in Green party voting often depend largely on how distinct
the electoral rules are in national and European elections. In Chapter 2, it was noted that the
SMP and majoritarian systems arc unfavourable to smaller parties because they highly favour
only the two biggest parties. On the other hand, PR often leads to a multi-party system and the
development of smaller parties is encouraged under such a system. This is because the
percentage of the seats a smaller party receives reflects the percentage of the vote that the party
garners. Thus, it was expected that Green parties would perform better in European ele<.:tions
conducted under PR, than in national elections conducted under majoritarian or plurality systems.
This was most evident in Great Britain, which uses 8MP and France, which employs the double-
ballot majoritarian system. Both of these electoral systems have proven to be extremely difficult
for the Greens, and they have consistently received smaller shares of the vote than they are
accorded in European ele<.:tions. Closely behind was Gennany, which uses MMP in national
elections, but relics entirely on PR in European elections. In Belgium and Luxembourg, where
PR is used in both types of elections, differences in the electoral rules has had little impact on the
discrepancies in Green party voting in comparison to France, Gennany and Great Britain.
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Turning to the election cycle model, the study has found that Green parties made gains
regardless of when EP elections have occurred in the national electoral cycle. However, what is
important was thaI the timing orEP elections did have an impact on the size of these gains. It
was noted in Chapter 2 thaI when an EP election is held in the early stages of the national
election cycle, the probability of smaller parties making large gains is less likely than during the
latc stages of the cycle. This is because of the fact governing parties are often pennitted a brief
honeymoon period and a posl~c1ection euphoria often ensues, leaving voters little time to become
disillusioned with such parties. During the mid-Ienn or late stages however, many voters choose
10 vote for a smaller party. Under these conditions, the Greens would be expected to make larger
gains than in the early stages. From analysing European and national electoral data, the study
found that this was the case in Belgium, Germany and in Great Britain. The only exception to
this case was in France, where the French Greens have made larger gains in EP elections that
occurred in the early stages of the cycle. Still, this finding may be eventually prove to be
anomalous. This is because the only French EP election held in the early stage was in 1989, an
election where many Green parties had their best ever performance in regards to vote share
percentage.
8.2 Directions for Future Research
There are many questions that can be raised about Green party voting in both types of
elections. In reviewing the literature and producing an empirical analysis of Green party voting,
this study has identified some areas requiring further research. This research comes through two
difTereni forms. First, future research may require readdressing the questions in this study and
determine whether the findings from this study continue to remain valid.
III
As well, a number ofother hypothesis can be considered to see if they are applicable to a
study of Green party voting in national and European elections. To begin, will the second-order
election model remain applicable to Green parties? To elaborate, as smaller parties, will the
Greens continue (0 make gains in these elections? What about Green parties that now find
themselves as coalition partners in their respective governments? Will they experience losses in
EP elections as was the case in Gennany in 1999, or will they continue to make gains in EP
elections as a smaller party, as was the case in France in the same European election?
Second, the findings reached in this study on Green party vOling and how it relates to the
election cycle model, is based on an analysis ofonly five EP elections. Is the evidence provided
in this study enough to make generalizations about Green party voting in future elections? To
extend this further, will Green parties that make their largest gains in the mid, or late stages of
the electoral cycle continue to do so in the future? Or, will these trends reverse themselves and
leave the election cycle model non-applicable in the case of the Greens?
Three additional hypotheses warrant particular attention and could be tested with further
analysis. First, although Green parties tend to do better in EP elections, asking whether the
Greens do better in all regions or districts of each country would be useful. To examine this
more closely, national case studies and regional election results could be used here to test this.
As well, national elections could tested against other types of sccond-order elections like
regional, municipal and Land elections. Do the Greens do better in these elections compared to
national elections? To examine this closer, data from these elections could be compared with the
results of national elections.
A second hypothesis that merits consideration is whether or not specific EP campaign
112
issues and strategies are factors that enable the Greens to receive a larger share of the vole in
these elections. To elaborate, because of their reluctance to accept further EU integration, is it
possible to think thai the Greens have been successful in tapping into anti-EU sentiment? As
well, is there grealer co-ordination amongst Green parties in EP elections compared to other
party groups within the European Parliament? A comparative analysis of campaign co-
ordination amongst the various party 'families' thai comprise the EP could be conducted.
Finally, it is reasonable to suspect that lower voter turnout in EP elections has a role in
explaining why the Greens win a larger percentage of the vote in European elections than in
national elections. A possible hypothesis is thai the Green parties receive a higher share oflhe
vote in European elections because smaller parties are better able to mobilize their supporters
Ihan larger parties. If a greatcr percentage of regular Green party voters are mobilized to go to
the polls, coupled with a [ower voter turnout, then obviously Ihey would comprise a larger share
of those thai do vote in Europcan elections. Although there is some indication that this is indeed
a fact. it has not been empirically tested in this study.
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